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Summary of the thesis 
 
This thesis focuses on Solvency II and the implications for life insurance. We first give 
an introduction to insurance and life insurance in general. Then we describe the balance 
sheet of a life insurance company. We also explain the need for a new framework as well 
as the participants behind it. Subsequently we focus on the solvency term. In the future 
the solvency assessment will be more closely related to the risk exposure of a company, 
thus we give a thorough description of the various risks facing life insurers. To illustrate 
the different aspects of the framework we have used the life insurance company Vital. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Solvency II is the new EU regulatory framework in the insurance sector. The need for a 
new supervisory regime has been triggered by the rapid evolvement in the financial 
markets. New financial instruments have made investments more complex, and exposure 
to risk for insurance companies has been altered. This has not been fully reflected in 
today’s regulatory regime. Solvency II will to a greater extent reflect the undertaking’s 
real risk. 
 
The purpose of our paper is to explain the new framework and give the reader an overall 
understanding of how the new regime will work and how it will affect the life insurance 
industry. Our thesis is to a large extent both explanatory and descriptive, but we have 
given a practical understanding of the new framework. Our thesis will focus on life 
insurance. This is due to personal preferences and the dynamic nature of that industry. 
It is very difficult to get a full understanding of how comprehensive Solvency II is, and 
the scope of the thesis does not allow enough room to give an elaborate description of 
every element. The new framework encompasses many different fields and each item 
could be a thesis. We could have to a much greater extent focused on one area. However, 
we believe it is much more useful for us to get an understanding of the entire framework 
rather than focusing the thesis on one specific item. The problem of the thesis is: 
We will explain Solvency II and outline how a given life insurance company can adapt 
to the different aspects of this new regulatory framework 
 
Since we had prior knowledge that Solvency II was related to a capital requirement we 
have followed up with a subordinated question: 
 
  Will Solvency II lead to an increased capital requirement for a life insurer? 
 5
2 Introduction to insurance 
 
The insurance sector carries significant importance in our western world. It is a 
considerable contributor to the economy, and a major institutional investor.  
The idea behind insurance is to protect oneself from a random future event, providing 
cover against various risks facing the citizens, corporations and other organisations. The 
risk can be related to theft, health or damage to property. People buy insurance to 
eliminate this risk; hence they are risk averse. Risk aversion can be illustrated by a lottery 
which pays an amount; a risk averse person will prefer a certain amount to an uncertain 
amount which has the same expected payout.  
In today’s modern economy the risk is divided between an individual and an insurance 
company. Insurance allows for shifting of risk1 by a payment of a premium. Insurance 
can therefore be regarded as a form of risk management primarily used to hedge (perfect) 
against the risk of a potential financial loss. In the case of an unfavorable event the 
claimant will receive a payout. The insurer will keep the premium if they do not receive a 
claim from the policyholder.  
The premium should reflect the price of the risk that the insurer has accepted. However, it 
is up to each insurer to determine the price of that risk. If the insurance price is actuarially 
fair the discounted expected loss will be equal to the premium. 
 [ ]
1 f
E X=P
r+   If  0fr ≠  
 Where: 
  = Premium 
 = Expected payout 
                                                
P
[ ]XE   
 
1 Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Sclesinger (2005). 
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fr  = Risk free interest rate 
 
Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations) developed the standard formula for pricing an insurance 
contract: 
 
[ ]P E X k R= + +  
 Where: 
[ ]X = Expected payout E   
k  = Cost 
R  = Risk premium (compensation to bear risk) 
 to meet its future obligations and the 
insurance contracts will be worthless.        
contracts have basis risk , in contrast to insurance contracts that are perfect hedges.  
 
elps 
employers and thus providing financial security for their employees.          
                                                
 
In principle, insurers can compete on costs and the risk premium. If the insurer 
consistently loses money it will not be able
Insurance contracts are not easily tradable and thus high transaction costs are present. 
There exists no developed market for trading contracts either. Normal futures and options 
2
Insurance is of great importance in today’s world. Insurance allow the participators of the 
economy to produce goods and services without fearing that an incident could leave them
unable to function. Non-life insurance allows victims of accidental loss to recover 
financially through the payment of claims for property damage and injury. The largest 
claimers are car repair shops, building contractors and health care. Life insurance h
households manage their finances in the face of death, disability or retirement. By 
providing financial security to individuals, life insurance products help stabilize the 
whole economy. Insurance companies also contribute to the economy by being very large 
 
2 Basis risk is present when the value of a financial instrument does not move in line with the underlying 
asset (Jorion 2002). 
 7
As the financial product spectre has eroded in number and complexity, so has the 
insurance business portfolio. Their investments range from stocks, corporate and 
government bonds, real estate to different types of options, foreign currency. 
Consequently the companies are exposed to different types of risks. These risks will be 
analyzed in later chapters. 
To be certain that the insurance companies honour the contractual commitments they 
have made to the insured and to protect the insured from the undertaking’s risk exposure, 
regulation and supervision is essential. Insurance companies should be financially able to 
meet their commitments at all times. The regulative framework will in the future be more 
closely related to the risk exposure of an undertaking. 
 
The general features of life insurance will be explained in greater detail through the next 
chapters. 
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3 Life Insurance 
 
In life insurance, insurers’ obligations are related to the policyholders’ health and/or life. 
Customers pay a premium for protection of some form against an unfavorable event. 
Unlike other savings plans, life insurance offer full economic protection against the risk 
of death. Payment of life insurance premiums can become a habit, thus it motivates 
increased savings. Life insurance companies accumulate large amounts of capital through 
premiums and these funds can be invested in the market place. The premiums though, do 
not belong to the insurance companies. They only invest them on behalf of the 
policyholders, but they might get a profit on the investment.  
The specter of life insurance products can be divided into the following categories: 
1) Life 
a) Term life insurance - Provides death protection for a stated time period, or 
term. This is the most basic form of life insurance. It usually provides 
affordable protection, often with a guaranteed payout, for some period of time. 
If the insured should die while the policy is in force, the face amount is paid to 
the named beneficiary. At the end of the guarantee period, the insured can 
renew the coverage at a higher premium. The premium for term life insurance 
is initially lower than a comparable permanent insurance policy; however, it 
can increase at each renewal. This initial lower premium usually makes term 
insurance an ideal choice for individuals with a temporary need for life 
insurance protection. 
b) Whole life insurance - Provides coverage for an individual's whole life, rather   
than a specified term. Premiums are fixed and must generally be paid as long 
as the policy is in force. It can include a fixed guaranteed rate of return. 
c) Universal life insurance – A modified form of whole life insurance. Part of the 
premium buys insurance coverage that will be paid if the insured dies. The rest 
of it is invested in securities that are intended to increase the policy's cash 
 9
value. The premiums and payouts can vary. It often includes a fixed 
guaranteed rate of return. 
d) Variable life insurance – An extreme version of universal life, where payout is 
fully dependent on the return of the invested premium given a chosen risk 
profile. 
 
2) Pension 
a) Non-participating – Payout after time n if death has not occurred or regular 
payouts from a certain time m to a time n which doesn’t have to be specified. 
b) Defined benefit pension plan – Same as above, but the size of the payouts is 
given in the contract. 
c) Defined contribution based pension plan – Here, the size of the payouts 
depends on the return of the invested premiums. The size of the premiums is 
given in the contract. 
Reasons for committing to a life insurance contract are many.  First, individuals want to 
insure themselves to secure the future of those who are dependant on them. This is 
particularly the case if they are the family’s main source of income. Second, life 
expectancies have gone up, while the active working period has decreased. Individuals 
who tend to live way beyond their earning years often get problems with increased costs 
of living. A pension plan can be the solution. It can suit their profile in terms of income, 
expected retirement age and expected expenses after retirement. Third, an individual can 
have a health problem that will cost him an amount beyond his financial capacity. 
Allowing the individual to surrender the insurance policy, might solve the individual’s 
problems. Fourth, life insurance savings provide tax benefits in many countries. There are 
numerous different products available in the insurance market, and the number is 
increasing with the complexity of the financial instruments. This is not within the scope 
of the thesis, so we will leave the overview of the specific products here. 
The insurance business is faced by different types of regulation. In Norway, the profit 
sharing level is regulated to a minimum of 65%, the guaranteed return maximum 2.75% 
and the amount of capital invested in equities maximum 30%. There are also restrictions 
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on the leverage ratio. We will in the following focus on a different type of regulation, 
namely the one that affects the size of solvent assets in an insurance company. This has 
become increasingly important over the past decade. The capital markets have evolved 
and grown rapidly. Money has been poured into the markets looking for high returns. The 
derivatives markets have expanded, making investments more complicated. Life insurers 
have put more money into equity markets as regulation has given them the possibility to 
increase their holdings. The minimum guaranteed rate of interest combined with the low 
interest rates has presented a challenge for life insurers as to how to meet the guaranteed 
returns. In many cases, risky equity investments have been the solution. However, the 
turbulence in the markets has left life insurers exposed, as became obvious with the 
collapse of Lloyds in England. The need for better risk management programs that reflect 
today’s risk is essential. This is the cornerstone of the new regulatory framework. 
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4 Balance sheet 
 
To understand the Solvency II framework we need to introduce the balance sheet of a life 
insurance company. In this chapter we will clarify the different parts of the balance sheet, 
explaining the main components of the assets and liabilities. For illustrative purposes we 
have simplified this balance sheet considerably, and have adapted it to Vital3. In chapter 8 
we will use the balance sheet to illustrate an undertaking’s risk.  
 
The main components of the asset side of the balance sheet are stocks, bonds and real 
estate. The liability side of the balance sheet consists of equity, technical provisions and 
an adjustment reserve. Equity is the capital of the shareholders (we have disregarded 
mutual insurance companies). Technical provisions consist of the premium reserves and a 
loss reserve. The premium reserves are the property of the customers. It has a guaranteed 
return and is supposed to cover future claims. The loss reserve is supposed to be a buffer 
for years with an unfavorable investment return. It consists of additional statutory reserve 
and other technical reserves. 
 
The technical provisions are an estimate of the size of the debt, which size depends upon 
actuarial assumptions i.e. morbidity, mortality and longevity in life. They are calculated 
based on a discounting rate which today is the guaranteed return. The adjustment reserve 
gives value to the unrealized gains on current assets. The hidden reserve comes either 
from market values which differ from their accounting values or a discrepancy in the 
accounting valuation of technical provisions and their valuation in the solvency 
framework. Figure 1 gives an illustration of the balance sheet. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Vital is the market leader in the Norwegian pension market. They manage more than 200 billion NOK, 
have approximately 920 employees, and insure more than 900 000 persons. 
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Figure 1 Simplified balance sheet 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
 EQUITY 
STOCKS ADJUSTMENT RESERVE 
    
 LOSS RESERVE 
   
BONDS   
   
   
  PREMIUM RESERVE 
   
REAL ESTATE   
   
HIDDEN RESERVE HIDDEN RESERVE 
 
 
We have analyzed the annual report (2005) for Vital and adapted the balance sheet to the 
simplified one. We know that the stock portfolio consists of a domestic part and an 
international part. The domestic portfolio is mainly invested in stocks listed on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange and has an overall risk comparable to Oslo Børs All-share Index. The 
international stock portfolio is invested according to the Morgan Stanley Developed 
World Index, with around 59 % in North-America, 28 % in Europe and 13 % in Asia. We 
assume the mutual funds have a similar structure as the stock portfolio. We have 
separated the different types of stocks in the balance sheet.  
 
The bond portfolio consists of a domestic part and an international part. For the later 
calculations involving bonds we have used information from the annual report about 
duration and the yield to maturity.  We have disregarded money market placements, real 
estate derivatives, other current and non-current assets, and in our simplified balance 
sheet we have kept them as “other assets” only for equilibrium purposes.  
On the liability side we have included subordinated debt to the equity post. We have also 
put all relevant posts under technical provisions. The adjustment reserve is given in the 
original balance. The remaining posts we have added as other liabilities. As a 
consequence of our approach, the simplified balance sheet can be illustrated as follows: 
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Table 1  Simplified balance sheet of Vital (Numbers in Million NOK.)  
ASSETS   LIABILITIES   
Stocks - Oslo Børs All-share Index 10 192 Equity 9 654
Stocks - DWI North America 13 198    
Stocks - DWI Europe 6 264 Adjustment reserve 5 503
Stocks - DWI Asia 2 908    
Domestic bonds  47 293 Premium reserve 158 299
International bonds  18 344 Loss reserve 10 867
Current assets 98 167 Technical provisions 169 166
     
Domestic bonds held to maturity 45 381    
International bonds held to 
maturity 5 865    
Non-current assets 51 246    
     
Real Estate 22 872    
     
Other assets 15 651 Other liabilities 3 645
     
Total Assets 187 968 Total Liabilities 187 968
 
 
All assets are valued at their market values, with the exception of bonds held to maturity 
(HTM)4. They are valued at cost value. However, CEIOPS5 believes that assets should 
generally be accounted for at their market value and consequently we have used market 
values for the capital requirement calculations. This leads to a change in the value of the 
bonds held to maturity to 48148 for domestic bonds and 6366 for international bonds. It 
also affects the technical provisions, which we will elaborate on in chapter 6. 
 
                                                 
4 Bonds not held to maturity are referred to as NHTM. 
5 CEIOPS is the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors. It was 
established in 2003 to design the new EU solvency system.
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5 Solvency II 
 
5.1 The need for a new solvency regime 
 
Insurance companies enter into commitments with their customers and the customers 
should be entitled to assume that the insurers will be able to meet these commitments. 
This is the motive behind the present legislation on Solvency rules. 
  
The first EU solvency system (First Directive, 1973 for non-life and 1979 for life) were 
implemented as Norwegian Law as part of the EEA-agreement in 1994. This was the first 
definition of capital requirements exceeding insurance obligations. It was based on 
simple calculations for the premium reserves, premiums, compensations and uncovered 
risk. The focus was mainly on insurance risk. The system, introduced in the 1970s, has 
played a significant role in increasing the quality of supervision. However, general 
economic features as well as insurance practices have changed. The insurance industry 
has had to face increased competition, convergence between financial sectors as well as 
international dependence. At the same time insurance, asset, and risk management 
methods and techniques have been refined.  
 
Shortly before the new millennium the system was put under significant pressure. 
Insurers were chasing volume by reducing premiums. Many insurers' reserves would 
prove insufficient for the volume of past liabilities, as well as allowing their capital 
position to erode. General insurers had invested a disproportionate amount of their assets 
in equities. Regulation was no longer suited to the insurance business. To eliminate these 
and other problems, the work to build a new and better Solvency regime, within the 
EU/EEA-members, had already started.  
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As a first step in reforming the existing solvency regime, the European Commission in 
2000 launched Solvency I6. Here, the minimum risk-bearing capital was calculated as a 
fixed percentage of the technical provisions in life insurance and in non-life insurance as 
a percentage of premiums written. The absolute minimum requirement was also increased 
to 3 million euros and would be updated in line with EU consumer price inflation. In 
addition, the required solvency margin capital had to be met at all times rather than just at 
the date of the last balance sheet. Solvency I forced the EU/EEA-members to set more 
stringent capital requirement rules for the undertakings they authorize than the minimum 
requirements set in the first Directive. The different items eligible for inclusion in the 
solvency margin capital7 have also been clarified and categorized according to their 
relative financial strength. We will discuss the solvency margin capital in depth in 
chapter 8.5. Here we will explain the calculation of the solvency margin capital as of 
today. All in all, Solvency I made the general insurance industry much more resilient. 
Investment portfolios are more balanced, and balance sheets are stronger.  
 
While reforming the former Solvency regime, many EU/EEA Member States remarked 
that the changed business situation for insurance undertakings would call for a more 
fundamental review in which the whole EU insurance supervisory architecture should be 
examined. The work on the most controversial issues was postponed to Solvency II, a 
project also launched in 2000. Several of the risk factors that are an inherent part of the 
insurance business had not been fully reflected in the former solvency regime, even 
though these risk factors had often been the ultimate cause of company failure. This 
situation stressed the need for methods reflecting the entire risk exposure of an insurance 
company. Ideally, the capital requirement of an insurance company should reflect all risk 
factors that are relevant to the company in order to reflect a true and fair measure of the 
economic status of the companies. This reasoning is recognized in the present work of 
Solvency II. With the help of Solvency II there will be an increased consistency between 
the companies’ real risk exposure and the solvency margin capital. There will be a 
harmonization of the regulatory regimes, which will result in increased transparency and 
                                                 
6 Solvency I was implemented in 2003. 
7 Capital resources which should cover the capital requirement. 
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a better approach to the industry’s risk management. The system should also include 
incentives for companies to assess and manage their risks. Furthermore, the system 
should be in line with the international developments in solvency, risk management, 
supervisory and accounting. As in Basel II, the new regulation will consist of advanced 
modeling, both internal and standardized, and a higher focus on the companies’ internal 
control systems and risk management. We will elaborate on this in the following 
chapters. 
 
5.2 The process and participants 
 
The Solvency II project is seen as an integrated part of developments within solvency 
itself, insurance accounting and related fields such as risk management. The project can 
be divided into two phases. The first phase was concluded in 2003. Here Member States 
and the European Commission Services studied a number of areas in order to decide on 
the general design of a future EU solvency system. These include use of risk-based 
capital (RBC) systems, lessons to draw from Basel II and use of internal models. It also 
changed the EU regulatory architecture, and as a result CEIOPS was created.  
 
The Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) 
was established pursuant to the European Commission Decision 2004/6/EC of 5 
November 2003. CEIOPS is composed of high level representatives from the insurance 
and occupational pensions supervisory authorities of the European Union Member States. 
The authorities of the Member States of the European Economic Area and the present 
candidate countries, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the European Commission, 
participate in CEIOPS' activities as observers. CEIOPS performs the functions of the 
level 3 Committee for the insurance and occupational pensions sectors. This role involves 
providing advice to the European Commission on the drafting of implementation 
measures for framework directives and regulations on insurance and occupational 
pensions ("Level 2 activities") and establishing supervisory standards, recommendations 
and guidelines to enhance convergent and effective application of the regulations and to 
facilitate cooperation between national supervisors ("Level 3 activities"). CEIOPS report 
regularly to the European Commission and the European Parliament. 
   Http://www.ceiops.org 
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CEIOPS is the main organizer for the second phase of the Solvency II project. This phase 
concentrates on preparing legal EU texts as well as more detailed technical rules and 
guidance. To help fulfil its tasks CEIOPS has established multinational Working Groups. 
These large groups consist of specialists/economists/actuaries from the financial 
supervisory authorities of the affected countries. They give specialist input to the ongoing 
work. CEIOPS also ensures its accountability by cooperating closely with other EU 
Institutional bodies dealing with financial services, such as the Economic and Financial 
Committee (EFC), the Financial Services Committee (FSC) and the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Committee (EIOPC). By doing this they hope to converge 
approaches on aspects of common interest. CEIOPS will also make use of IAIS8 
standards and guidance as basis for the future regulations, and will apply the new IASB9 
accounting rules as a cornerstone for Solvency II. Solvency II can also help with input to 
IASB.  
 
The required harmonization across the EU/EEA can only be completed if it has strong 
political support. The creation of a robust regulatory framework for supervision and the 
adoption of effective supervisory practices are dependent upon a wide sharing of 
regulatory and supervisory policy. It is also dependent on a clear and complete 
knowledge of market situation and needs. CEIOPS therefore seeks input and inspiration 
during public consultation processes, from market participants, consumers, end users and 
any other interested external parties. This input helps to prepare its advice to the 
European Commission and the drafting of its own recommendations. Figure 2 illustrates 
the timeline of Solvency II.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
9 International Accounting Standards Board 
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Figure 2 Timeline for Solvency II 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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Legislative 
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the EU-commision
Discussions in 
the European
Parliament
Adaption to 
national rules
Solvency II is 
implemented
CEIOPS works with “implementing measures” (level 2), 
QIS, CP
 
5.3 The three Pillar framework 
 
At this stage Pillars 1, 2 and 3 are still in the developing stages and the following chapters 
are based on the preliminary work. It is expected that CEIOPS will use 2 years on 
problems concerning the different pillars. 
  
The new Solvency system will not only consist of formulas and indicators, but also cover 
several qualitative aspects like management, internal control and competitive situation. 
These aspects influence the risk profile of insurance undertakings. The new system will 
be more risk-based than the current one, and focus needs to be put on risk analysis and 
risk mitigation techniques. Increasing the accuracy of calculations (for example of 
solvency capital requirements) through internal models will be encouraged by the system. 
A similar approach has been used in the banking sector with the New Basel Accord 
(Basel II). The work on Solvency II is closely related to this three Pillar framework. We 
will discuss this in the following chapters. 
 
Solvency II should be compatible with banking rules and as far as possible similar 
products should be supervised in the same way. Although this convergence between 
financial sectors hopefully is accelerated by Solvency II, it is important to remember to 
adjust the banking-inspired structure, to the different nature of insurance. The balance 
sheet is of particular interest. 
 19
6 Pillar 1  
 
Pillar 1 explores the range of capital requirements in terms of financial strength, risks, 
internal models and minimum capital requirements.  
 
6.1 Calculation of the technical provisions 
 
Insurance contracts are very complex products and include characteristics from both 
bonds and options. In the current Solvency regime, this is not fully recognized. In order 
to estimate the technical provisions properly, an important first step is to harmonize the 
interest rate parameter used in discounting the future cash flows. A second step is to have 
similar accounting standards; this means that liabilities are measured according to the 
same principles irrespective of jurisdiction. This need of harmonizing the methods is 
crucial. Comparisons are almost impossible when different methods are used.   
 
Today’s insurance directives require technical provisions to be cautiously estimated. The 
problem is though what the level of prudence should be. Today’s directive does not give 
any detailed guidance concerning this problem and many countries have had a desire to 
establish a quantitative benchmark. One starting point when calculating the provisions 
can be to estimate expected values of a relevant distribution and later add risk margins. 
The desired level of prudence needs to be established. This can be based on regulations or 
market forces. Obvious problems are technical challenges, national differences and lack 
of supervision.  
 
Future obligations in life insurance will reflect all payments made to policyholders. The 
premium reserve is calculated from the present value of the expected future payments. 
The risk margin of the premium reserves will be calculated based on a historical 
distribution given a confidence level of 75 % and 90 % which will be tested in 
Quantitative Impact Studies (see figure 2). The expected cash flows should be based on 
actuarial assumptions, for example mortality rates and claims frequency. 
 20
 
Figure 3 Risk margin on the technical provisions 
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To arrive at the present value of the cash flows they have to be discounted, and which 
discount rate shall be used is something that needs to be determined. IASB suggests using 
a risk-free market interest rate of relevant duration and currency, a so-called fair value 
approach. At present the average discount rate is 3.6% for the premium reserves. As an 
estimate of the risk free rate, we have used the interest rate on 10 year Norwegian 
government bonds. Currently the rate is approximately 4%, and in the near future it is 
more likely to rise than to fall. A fair valuation of the liabilities will then include an 
increase in the discount rate from 3.6% to at least 4%. The total duration10 for the 
liabilities in the Norwegian life insurance market is approximately 15 years 
(Kredittilsynet 2005). We will use the same duration for Vitals liabilities in our 
calculation. We can illustrate the change in the value of the premium reserves as follows:  
 
 * *PR discount PR PRMV MV∆ = ∆ D  
 Where: 
 PRMV∆  = Change in market value premium reserves 
 PRMV   = Market value premium reserves  
  = Change in discount rate (=change in risk free rate) discount∆
                                                 
10 Duration is the weighted average life of today’s value of all future cash flows. The Macauley duration is 
the weighted-average term to maturity of the cash flows for the assets or liabilities. The modified duration 
also accounts for changing interest rates.  
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 PRD   = Duration premium reserves 
 
The new value of the premium reserves is given in table 2. 
 
Table 2  Value of the premium reserve11
    Duration of liabilities 
 Average discounting rate: 10 years 15 years 20 years 
4% 157687 148801 145635
3.60% 158299 158299 158299
 
For the rest of our thesis, we will assume that the value of the premium reserve is given 
in the case of duration of 15 years and a discount rate of 4%. 
 
Another important aspect in life insurance is how to value bonuses. The work of 
Solvency II leans towards well-defined profit-sharing rules between policyholders and 
insurance companies. IASB wants a clear distinction between capital and liabilities. After 
a bonus policy rule is defined, bonuses can be valued with the help of DCF supplemented 
by asset liability management (ALM) and option pricing methods. We will not discuss 
the valuation of guarantees, options and bonus’, but we will elaborate on ALM when we 
discuss the market risk in the following chapter. 
 
6.2 Capital requirements 
 
The Solvency II system will have two binding levels of regulatory capital requirements, 
on top of the technical reserves (which will equal the technical provisions + risk margin). 
The two levels will be the minimum capital requirement (MCR) and the solvency capital 
requirement (SCR). The MCR is a part of the SCR. After a capital requirement is 
determined, regulation will decide what types of capital can cover the requirement. This 
will be discussed in chapter 6.3. 
 
                                                 
11 This is dependent upon that life insurance companies can start with a fair valuation of the liabilities 
which is not the case currently. 
 22
6.2.1 Minimum Capital Requirement 
 
The Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR) is a part of the SCR; it is supposed to be an 
absolute minimum of the capital level. A breach of the MCR will trigger ultimate 
supervisory action. The MCR should be calculated in a more simple way than the SCR, 
and could be an absolute floor. This would make it easier for small undertakings to adapt 
to the new rules. As the MCR and the SCR will have different calculations, a possible 
outcome is that the SCR could be lower than the MCR which would mean that the MCR 
is overstating the risk. The following are considered by CEIOPS for the level of the 
MCR; a calculation based on the existing Solvency I requirements, MCR as a margin 
over liabilities and a calculation based on the standard formula for the SCR. There is a 
general opinion among Member States that the MCR level should be calculated in a 
simple way. This is also the case in the current Solvency regime where minimum risk-
bearing capital is calculated as a fixed percentage of the technical provisions in life 
insurance and in non-life insurance as a percentage of premiums written. A similar 
calculation can be used in Solvency II, with suitable adjustments. 
 
6.2.2 Solvency Capital Requirement 
 
We will elaborate on the solvency capital requirement in chapter 8. 
 
6.3 Solvency Margin Capital 
 
The solvency margin capital refers to the capital resources an insurance company, from 
the supervisors point of view, can use to cover the solvency capital requirement. Looking 
at Vitals financial report, we can see how today’s rules are reflected in the calculation of 
solvency margin capital. From the net subordinated debt, 50% of additional statutory 
reserves and everything above the lower limit of 55% of security reserve is added. This is 
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to compare with the solvency margin requirement, which in general should be 8% of risk 
adjusted assets.  
 
There is an ongoing discussion which resources to include in the solvency margin capital 
in Solvency II. Since the valuation of both assets and technical provisions will now be 
based on market values, and since the solvency capital requirement is supposed to cover 
all risks, the capital resources included in the solvency margin capital are expected to 
increase. A smaller part of the risk should be accounted for in the loss reserve and the risk 
margin. Possibly 100% of the additional statutory reserves and the security reserves 
should be added to the solvency margin capital. In addition to this the adjustment reserve 
as a whole should be added. One important aspect to consider when moving reserves 
meant to cover the premium reserves are to allocate these funds in such a way that they 
still belong to the customers and not the company.  
 
Illustrating the possible change in solvency margin capital: 
 
Table 3  Solvency margin capital (Numbers in Million NOK.) 
Capital resources Today Solvency II 
Net subordinated debt 9312 9312
Security reserve 90 201
Total additional statutory reserves 1894 3788
Adjustment reserve 0 5503
Solvency margin capital 11296 18804
 
The solvency margin capital will increase with more than 50% if this is the final 
regulative outcome. We will use the new outcome as a reference when approaching the 
solvency capital requirements in chapters 8 and 9. 
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7 Risk 
 
The new Solvency II framework is based on a total risk approach. This chapter will give 
an overview of a suitable risk measure for the framework 
 
If we consider the balance sheet presented in chapter 4, we have equity as the solvent 
capital. The solvent capital is the excess of assets over liabilities. Liabilities consist of 
technical provisions and an adjustment reserve, which can be seen as a risk margin. 
Changes in the level of solvent capital will depend on the risks to which an undertaking is 
exposed and the development of assets and liabilities. Since this development is 
unknown, the future level of solvent capital will behave stochastically. It may be 
described by a probability distribution, which measures the likelihood of all possible 
outcomes. 
 
CEIOPS is considering two different alternatives for the calculation of the capital at risk; 
Value at risk (VaR) and Tail-VaR. These risk measures are functions that assign an 
amount of capital to a risk distribution. A central part of these models is that they enable 
risks to be aggregated.  
 
VaR models are popular for measuring market risk; it is the expected loss over a pre-
determined horizon at a given degree of confidence. VaR became a key measure of 
market risk since the Basle Committee stated that banks should be able to cover losses on 
their trading portfolios over a ten-day horizon, 99 percent of the time. It is also quite 
normal to use VaR for internal risk control. 
 
From a mathematical viewpoint, VaR measures the quantile of the projected distribution 
of gains and losses over a given time horizon. With confidence level α, VaR is the 1-α 
lower-tail level. 
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Figure 4 Illustration of VaR and Tail-VaR 
 
Source: CEIOPS 
 
The time horizon, the frequency of the data, the cumulative distribution function of the 
price change of a given portfolio over the time horizon under consideration and the 
amount of the financial position need to be set, when estimating the VaR confidence 
level.  
 
In two different papers, Artzner et al. (1997, 1998) have criticized VaR as a measure of 
market risk on two grounds. First they show that VaR is not necessarily subadditive. 
Subadditivity is a desirable feature of a risk measure. It implies that the aggregation of 
risks does not lead to an increase in overall risk12. They explain that this may cause 
problems if one bases a risk-management system of a financial institution on VaR-limits 
for different securities individually. VaR does not enjoy the property of being 
subadditive, except in the case of normally distributed risks. 
 
Second, VaR gives only an upper bound on the losses that occur with a given frequency. 
VaR tells us nothing about the potential size of the loss given that the specified quantile is 
exceeded. In insurance business, undertakings are subject to infrequent, severe losses, i.e 
catastrophic events. In this case the risk distribution will feature a fat tail, compared to 
                                                 
12 Formally it means that ρ(A + B) ≤ ρ(A) + ρ(B), where ρ is a risk measure and A,B represent any two 
portfolios. 
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the standard normal distribution. VaR might therefore not be the appropriate risk measure 
in insurance business. 
 
To solve these two problems, Artzner et al. (1997, 1998) suggested using the so-called 
expected shortfall or tail conditional expectation (TailVar) instead of VaR. TailVaR is a 
subadditive risk measure which reflects severe and infrequent losses. The Tail-VaR will 
give a fat tail which might produce a better assessment of the risk. Using it can encourage 
an undertaking’s stakeholders to consider the consequences of a potential default, not 
only the probability of insolvency. It can create an incentive for insurance undertakings to 
improve their treatment of low-frequency, high-severity risks. For these reasons, the IAA 
Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party has suggested to use TailVaR when 
computing the solvency requirements. 
 
The most important disadvantage using TailVaR is the scarcity of data, which could lead 
to increased modeling error. A formula based on TailVaR is difficult to generalize and 
might not provide a good fit for the majority of insurance undertakings. The tail data used 
for modeling is often individually related, and might not be representative. This is 
probably the reason why The Commission Services are proposing to CEIOPS the use of 
VaR as a general principle for calculating the SCR. Using an internal risk model can 
solve the problem of individuality and more advanced modeling techniques could be 
used. This includes the use of TailVaR.  
 
VaR models require data to be gathered over a long period of time as the models are 
based on daily price movements and long time series. Another problem with VaR is that 
it does not deal with unexpected changes in historical correlations and default. A large 
change in the volatility will lead to a change in the portfolio VaR. VaR models may not 
always capture the true risk either and are also not a complete measure of risk. The 
accuracy of the models is strongly dependent on that the different risks to be aggregated 
are accurately modeled. 
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The main statistical challenge in implementing VaR or TailVaR as a risk measure is to 
make a good estimate for the tails of the profit and loss function of an underlying 
portfolio. Having these values makes it rather easy to compute both of them. 
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8 Solvency Capital Requirement 
 
Refer to CEIOPS consultation paper no. 7 and Kredittilsynet 2005 for many of the 
formulas used in the calculation of the solvency capital requirement. However, we have 
made adjustments where necessary. 
 
The second level of regulatory capital requirements and the main supervisory tool in the 
future Solvency II system will be the SCR. The definition of the SCR in the draft 
amended Framework for Consultation for Pillar I:  
 
The SCR should deliver a level of capital that enables an insurance undertaking to absorb 
significant unforeseen losses and gives reasonable assurance to policyholders that 
payments will be made to them as they fall due 
  www.ceiops.org 
 
In this chapter we have explored the different risks to be covered under Solvency II and 
how these will affect the SCR. Section 8.1 covers market risk.  Section 8.2 gives an 
introduction to underwriting risk. Section 8.3 will look at credit risk. Section 8.4 will look 
at the operational risk. In section 8.5 the risks are aggregated. We have illustrated the risk 
based on Vital, and in a simplified way outlined the calculation, size and scope of the 
new regulatory capital requirement.  
  
The starting point for SCR may be the so called 'economic capital', a statistical measure 
based on the loss distribution reflecting the necessary capital required to obtain a 
probability of default less than a certain value. Use of economic capital as a risk measure 
will in theory make insurance companies take prudent positions. Therefore, the expected 
restrictions on asset allocation from Solvency II might be unnecessary. The SCR will, 
when appropriate, be calculated through the value at risk (VaR) method, given a certain 
time horizon and confidence level. More concrete, the SCR should deliver the amount of 
capital necessary to ensure, within the chosen confidence level, that assets will exceed 
future obligations (in our case technical provisions) over a chosen time horizon.  
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 The time horizon for the SCR should reflect the frequency for which results are produced 
and the ability of undertakings and supervisors to act, if or when necessary, e.g. when 
assets fall below technical provisions. Due to the one-year periodic nature of business, 
this seems like a natural time horizon to be applied for the SCR calculations. This does 
not prevent insurance companies from using internal models with different horizons that 
can describe the nature of their business more realistically. One problem with the one-
year horizon occurs when an undertaking’s liabilities extend beyond one year. At the end 
of the year assets may still exceed liabilities, but the VaR confidence level might be 
lower. The SCR should also reflect the capital needed at the end of the time horizon. This 
means that new businesses, which might change the undertaking’s risk profile, generally 
should be reflected in the capital requirements.  
 
The level of prudence or confidence for the SCR will need to be assessed using 
quantitative analysis. If the confidence level is raised, capital requirements are unlikely to 
increase in a linear manner. This means that raising the VaR level from 99% to 99.5% 
potentially could increase the SCR more than a move from 95% to 99%. The result of a 
given level of prudence does not consider e.g. domino-effects. A VaR-level of 99.5% 
does not necessarily mean that 1 out of 200 insurance undertakings will fail within a year, 
or that ruin will occur once every 200 years for an undertaking. It can also mean that 0 
out of 200 companies will fail the next 199 years, but 200 out 200 might fail in exactly 
200 years. Calculating the SCR at a certain level of prudence might also under- or 
overestimate the capital requirement, and an adjustment factor might be applied (as in 
Basel II). Moreover the SCR should reflect the capital level suitable to the insurers’ level 
of risk. The SCR level should be met at all times.  
 
SCR = VaR (99.5%) 
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Figure 5 Level of prudence for the SCR 
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If a company cannot fulfil the target SCR, then this will trigger supervisory review and 
corrective actions. 
 
The SCR should take all quantifiable risks into account and those are to be covered by the 
solvency margin capital. It is desirable to have most risks covered in Pillar 1 to ensure 
they are quantified and taken into account for the SCR calculation. If they are considered 
in Pillar 2 it might be difficult to give a proper assessment of the risk as this will be a 
qualitative assessment of the risks. However, the modeling approaches to be used in the 
SCR standard formula require considerable further analysis. The SCR should identify and 
quantify the risks the customer is exposed to; market risk, underwriting risk, credit risk 
and operational risk. We will elaborate on these risks in the following sections. 
 
There is a fifth risk which will not be covered in the SCR at the moment, this is liquidity 
risk. Liquidity risk is a financial risk related to whether the firm has cash in hand to meet 
its obligations. If the insurer looks at its future net cash flows it can see whether there 
might be a problem related to meeting its obligations. If the life insurer has a large 
portfolio the law of large numbers will ensure that the cash flows should be reasonably 
predictable for a one year time horizon. The analysis should be supplemented by a stress 
test where it could be assumed counterparty defaults. This stress test should be covered 
under Pillar 2 and would ensure proper liquidity planning. With a proper ALM system in 
place the cash flows should be coordinated and thereby reducing the liquidity risk.  
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8.1 Market risk 
 
Market risk is risk caused by fluctuations in prices on financial instruments, i.e. a change 
in a portfolio value caused by unfavourable market movements. The market movements 
could be changes in interest rates, equity prices, bond prices, real estate prices, exchange 
rates and changes in liquidity and volatility in the market. The main components of 
market risk are the interest rate risk (related to the guaranteed return13 and the risk related 
to bonds), equity risk, real estate risk, currency risk and risk related to derivatives. Since 
an approach to calculating the currency risk14 is not yet developed we have disregarded 
currency risk in our calculations. Moreover, previous stress tests15 have also shown that 
the currency risk is low (Kredittilsynet 2005). Furthermore, the currency risk can be 
assumed to be low due to the widespread use of derivatives. We will also disregard the 
risk related to derivatives for the various components of market risk. 
 
Market risk can also be dependent upon the asset liability structure of the undertaking and 
can be considerable when the duration of the liabilities is longer than the assets. Assets 
and liabilities should be considered simultaneously when the fluctuations in market prices 
affect both of them. The asset liability management (ALM) will therefore be of great 
importance in the overall risk management. Life insurance is characterized by long term 
obligations and thus the duration of the obligations exceeds the average duration of the 
assets. The value of the assets and liabilities may not move together and this is where the 
risk lies. There are various techniques for analyzing the asset-liability risk; among them 
are duration analysis and gap analysis16. Both of these approaches work well if the assets 
and liabilities compromise fixed cash flows, however with options it is a little more 
challenging. Another problem with duration analysis in ALM is using adequate duration 
measures. The duration analysis should therefore be complemented by scenario analysis. 
                                                 
13 It is not decided where the risk related to the guaranteed return should be placed, but for now it is 
considered in connection with market risk. 
14 CEIOPS is considering two different approaches to currency risk: a factor based approach or a scenario 
based approach. 
15 Stress tests are defined as shock-based changes in risk factors, reflected in a change of available capital. 
16 Gap analysis maps the cash flows according to when they mature and thereby checks if the cash flows 
net to 0. 
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Regarding Pillar I the focus should be on quantifying any mismatch between assets and 
liabilities, in the context of Pillar II it should cover all aspects of ALM which cannot be 
quantified and active management of the duration gap. ALM systems should be 
integrated with business strategies and assumptions on modeling of the factors which 
affect ALM need to be plausible (macroeconomic conditions, assets, liabilities, 
policyholder behaviour). 
 
Market risk is important because the value of investments held to meet policyholder 
liabilities could be less than what is guaranteed. Most of the reduction in value will lead 
to a decrease in the amount distributed (KPMG 2002). The advantage for life insurers is 
that since the nature of the business is over such a long period, market prices have the 
chance to recuperate and they will only be subject to a loss if prices remain depressed for 
a long period. Life insurers generally match their liabilities with low risk fixed income 
investments.  
 
There are different theoretical approaches for measuring market risk. First, the insurance 
sector can make use of stress tests. This scenario-based approach may lead to practical 
difficulties, particularly with regard to the verification of the results. We believe that 
stress tests will mostly be used for supervisory purposes and for internal control. 
Therefore we have explained this approach in depth under Pillar 2 (chapter 9.3). 
  
Second, as a practical alternative to a pre-specified stress test, a factor-based approach 
can be used. This direct calculation of the capital requirement is more likely to be used as 
the regulatory capital, and will therefore be the centre of attention of Pillar 1 and this 
chapter. A factor based model will replicate the effects of a pre-specified stress test for 
linear risks, while non-linear risks will be calculated as an approximate stress test. We 
can increase the quality of the approximations by adding risk factors, but there is a need 
for the standard formula to be easy to interpret and implement. This simplification causes 
the scenario-based and the factor-based approach to differ in value. In such circumstances 
an internal model may give a better reflection of an insurance company’s individual risk 
profile than a standard factor-based model. CEIOPS wants to test pre-specified stress 
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tests and a factor-based approximation in the Quantitative Impact Studies before deciding 
how market risk should be reflected in the standard formula. We will elaborate some on 
the differences of these respective approaches in chapter 9.3. 
 
We will now systematically assess the main components of market risk. 
 
8.1.1 Equity risk 
 
The equity risk is related to the fluctuations of equity prices. This is a major risk in most 
life insurance companies due to the size and risky nature of equity portfolios. We have, 
from a VaR approach calculated the capital requirement for the equity portfolio. We have 
used a variance-covariance approach. This approach assumes a particular distribution for 
the portfolio return, or for the underlying factors that drive returns, and uses that 
distribution to compute the appropriate quantile. The advantage of the variance-
covariance approach is that it is relatively easy to implement for simple portfolios. 
However, it is a poor approximation for ‘non-linear’ portfolios and relies critically on the 
distributional assumption of normality. This approach might be oversimplifying 
somewhat as the size of the portfolio is large and the assumptions underlying this 
approach might be broken.  
 
For the calculation of equity risk we have looked at the equity portfolio of Vital as of 
31.12.2005. The equity portfolio is divided into four main regions. The Norwegian 
portfolio has an aggregated risk which is comparable to the total index of the Oslo stock 
exchange. The international portfolio is invested comparably to the Morgan Stanley 
Developed World Index, with 59% in North America, 28 % in Europe and 13 % in Asia. 
Hence, for the estimation of the VaR of the equity risk we have used the following 
indices; Morgan Stanley North America (MSCI North America), Morgan Stanley Europe 
(MSCI Europe), Morgan Stanley Far East (MSCI Far East) and the total benchmark index 
of the Oslo stock exchange.  
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Table 4  Portfolio of Vital 
  Portfolio proportions 
MSCI EUROPE 0.19
MSCI FAR EAST 0.09
MSCI North America 0.41
TOT OSLO 0.31
 
The time series we used for Oslo was based on the total benchmark index from 
Datastream, the international indices came from Morgan Stanley (for further information 
see appendix A). We had to make certain adjustments to the series in order to obtain an 
estimate as accurate as possible on the returns. The indices were adjusted for dividend 
payments and to USD. The indices should capture most of the equity risk which Vital is 
exposed to. However, since we have reduced the number of stocks we might have lost 
some information with our approach. 
 
We estimated the mean, standard deviation and other statistics of daily returns using 
historical data necessary for our calculation. We checked to assure whether the 
assumptions of our model where adequate i.e. that the continuously compounded (log) 
daily returns of the indices were normally distributed. From figure 6 we see that the 
returns appear to be normally distributed and according to the Jarque-Bera17 test the 
returns were normally distributed for MSCI Europe. We also obtained the same results 
for the other indices18. If a portfolio is made of normal distributed series, then the 
aggregated portfolio will also be normal distributed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 The Jarque-Bera test tests for the null-hypothesis of normality. It is based on the skewness and kurtosis 
of the samples. For further information, see Introductory Econometrics for Finance (Brooks 2003). 
18 For the tables of the remaining indices see Appendix B. 
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Figure 6 Distribution of the time series and Jarque-Bera test 
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The time series satisfied the criteria of our model, so we proceeded to calculate the 
descriptive statistics of the returns for the indices: 
 
Table 5  Descriptive statistics of the indices 
  MSCI_EUROPE MSCI_FAR_EAST MSCI_N.A. TOT_OSLO 
 Mean 0.000329 0.000287 7.65E-05 0.000982
 Std. Dev. 0.011258 0.01251 0.010467 0.012033
 Skewness -0.219648 -0.307896 0.15569 -0.72422
 Kurtosis 5.930989 4.989092 5.953298 6.253667
         
 Jarque-Bera 476.8805 235.3917 478.7942 688.6534
 Probability 0 0 0 0
         
 Sum 0.428247 0.373944 0.099714 1.279857
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.165018 0.203765 0.142651 0.18852
 Observations 1303 1303 1303 1303
 
We then calculated the variance-covariance matrix for the returns of the different indices. 
 
Table 6  Variance covariance matrix for returns19
 MSCI_EUROPE MSCI_FAR_EAST MSCI_N.A. TOT_OSLO 
MSCI_EUROPE 0.00012700 0.00003150 0.00005770 0.00000196
MSCI_FAR_EAST 0.00003150 0.00015600 0.00001660 0.00001890
MSCI_N.A. 0.00005770 0.00001660 0.00010900 -0.00000588
TOT_OSLO 0.00000196 0.00001890 -0.00000588 0.00014500
 
We used high frequency data i.e. daily returns, because it gives us more information; 
however we are interested in a longer horizon for our VaR calculation and the 
                                                 
19 This is a symmetric matrix 
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distribution must be transformed accordingly. If the returns are independent and 
identically distributed or follow a random walk the transformation is easy. The efficient 
market hypothesis states that future prices cannot be anticipated and therefore must be 
uncorrelated over time (Jorion 2001).  Therefore to adjust returns and volatility for 
different time horizons we use the following:  
 
 *T t Tµ µ=  
 T t Tσ σ=  
Where: 
tµ  = Expected return for time period t  
tσ  = Standard deviation for time period t  
T  = Time period measured in days 
 
To find the VaR for our time horizon of one year and at a given confidence level of 
99.5%, we used the normal distribution. We calculated the annual (252 days) VaR from 
the one day VaR with the following formula: 
  
( ) * (1)VaR T T VaR=  
Where: 
T  = Time horizon in number of days 
(1)VaR = Value at risk for one day 
 
Using the normal distribution, we needed to establish the expected return and the 
variance of the portfolio. This is found by: 
  
 ( )
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( )pE R w w w w
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 Where: 
 ( )  = Expected portfolio return pE R
iw  = Share of the portfolio for index i  
 iµ  = Expected return index   i
 
And 
  ( )
11 12 13 14 1
21 22 23 24 2
1 2 3 4
31 32 33 34 3
41 42 43 44 4
( )p
w
w
Var R w w w w
w
w
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
 Where: 
  = Variance of portfolio return ( )pVar R
 ijσ   = Covariance between index i  and j  
 
Based on the expected return of the portfolio and variance of the portfolio we calculated 
the diversified VaR for the portfolio which is the SCR, the result is shown in table 7. 
 
Table 7  VaR for the aggregate portfolio based on a normal distribution 
(Numbers in Million NOK.) 
Initial investment as of 31.12.2005 32 562
Mean return 0.000424125
Portfolio sigma 0.007013455
Mean investment value 32 576
Sigma of investment value 228
Cutoff 31 988
Cumulative PDF 0.005
VaR for aggregated portfolio at 0,50% level for 1 day 574
VaR for aggregated portfolio at 0,50% level for 1 year = SCR 9 119
 
To demonstrate the benefits of diversification we have calculated the undiversified VaR 
which is the sum of the individual VaRs in the portfolio. As we can see the benefits of 
diversification are substantial and illustrate the importance of accurately estimating the 
correlations between the different assets. The total benefit of diversification can be 
measured as the difference between the diversified VaR and the undiversified VaR. 
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Table 8  Undiversified VaR (Numbers in Million NOK.) 
VaR for Asia at 0.50% level for 1 day 103
VaR for Oslo at 0.50% level for 1 day 467
VaR for North America at 0.50% level for 1 day 425
VaR for Europe at 0.50% level for 1 day 232
Undiversified VaR for portfolio at 0.50% level for 1 day 1 228
Undiversified VaR for portfolio at 0.50% level for 1 year 19 486
 
We have disregarded the derivatives positions for Vital which would have reduced the 
equity risk, as these are meant to hedge the portfolio risk. As a consequence we have 
overestimated the risk of the equity portfolio. This means that  with a value of    
9119 Million NOK probably is too high. There are also other problems with our 
approach. We have used a model that relies critically on the assumption of normality. 
However, financial returns are characterized by several established facts:   
equitySCR
 
1. They are characterized by volatility clustering which is illustrated in the time 
series MSCI Europe at 300-500.  
 
Figure 7 Volatility of MSCI Europe 
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A possibility to solve the problem of volatility clustering would be to incorporate 
varying volatility20. There could also be a problem with the series we have used. 
They are from 01.06.01 till present.   
 
2. Financial returns are also not normally distributed; they have fatter tales which we 
can see from figure 8 They are also likely to have a higher peak. 
 
Figure 8 Quantile-quantile report of the series MSCI Europe 
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The EVT approach is of use in estimating the probabilities of tail events. For 
normal confidence levels for example 90 and 95 the standard normal distribution 
can probably give decent results. However, for higher confidence levels it might 
be necessary to use an EVT distribution. However, the use of this distribution has 
to be tested for the firm. The t-distribution is a simple distribution for fatter tails 
that will describe the distribution of financial data fairly precisely.  
 
There is also a problem with the correlations in financial data: 
 
3. Correlations from our variance/covariance-matrices can also cause trouble, 
because our time series might only be correlated at extreme values.  
 
                                                 
20 This could be a GARCH model. For further information see Brooks (2003) 
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Other approaches to finding the equity risk would be modeling based on simulation of the 
portfolio based on the historical distribution of the portfolio returns and Monte Carlo 
simulation. However, due to the scope of the thesis we will not elaborate on this. 
 
8.1.2 Interest rate risk 
 
Interest rate risk is related to all assets and liabilities whose values are sensitive to 
changes in interest rates. In life insurance it relates to bonds, some derivatives, insurance 
liabilities and financing instruments. We will not elaborate on effects related to 
derivatives or financing instruments.  
 
For Solvency II there are two alternative measures for the total interest rate risk. A first 
approach is to model the value of the changes in the risk free interest rate with the Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross21 model. The parameters of the model would be set by the supervisory 
authorities with the help of historic time series and allowing for current market 
assessments. 
 
Another approach is to use a factor based model. This approach is based on the modified 
duration for fixed income investments and for premium reserves. Two possible scenarios 
are considered, a rise in interest rates and a fall in interest rates. The risk capital for the 
change in interest rates is the maximum of the two possible outcomes. We have split the 
interest rate risk in two parts. The first is linked to the guaranteed return of the premium 
reserves; this is named the interest guarantee risk. The second is related to the value of 
the bond portfolio; we call this the interest rate risk. The size of both risks depends on 
how the market interest rate develops. We have assumed that the premium reserves are 
discounted by a risk-free market interest rate of relevant duration and currency. This is 
consistent with the calculation of the technical provisions in chapter 6.1. The change in 
                                                 
21 Empirically interest rates appear to revert to a long run mean (Sundaresan 2002) this is known as mean 
reversion. The Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model incorporates mean reversion. The model is dr = κ (µ − r)dt + 
σdW, where µ is the long run mean of the short term interest rate, σ2 the variance and k is the speed of 
adjustment of the short rate to the long run mean and W is a wiener process. For further information see 
Sundaresan (2002). 
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the premium reserves’ discount rate is equivalent to the change in the long term interest 
rate. On the other hand, and due to shorter duration, the change in interest rates affecting 
the value of the bonds is considered to be the medium term interest rate. This rate could 
differ between bonds due to different duration, but in our calculation we have assumed all 
bonds to be affected by the same medium term interest rate. Similar reasoning can be 
used for premium reserves. We have assumed that the change in long term interest rate 
generally is smaller than a change in the medium term interest rate. Finally the domestic 
interest rates are considered to be equal to the international rates. 
 
The estimated effect on the premium reserves given a fall in the risk free rate can be 
expressed as:    
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )long long long longPR PR RF long PR RF RF PR RF PRCR MV r MV r r MV r D= + ∆ − ≈ −∆ ∗ ∗  
Where: 
PRCR    = Capital at risk for the premium reserves due to interest 
long
RFr     = Long risk free rate at the time of consideration 
long∆    = Change in long term risk free interest rate  
( )longPR RFMV r   = Market value premium reserves before change in interest 
rate 
( long )PR RF longMV r + ∆  = Market value premium reserves after change in interest 
rate 
PRD    = Average modified duration premium reserves 
 
Due to the complexity of the liabilities we have not separated the different insurance 
contracts within premium reserves in the formula. The approximation in the formula 
holds for small changes in the interest rate. The size of the risk related to the guaranteed 
return depends upon the change of the interest rates in the market and the duration and 
size of the premium reserves. 
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The calculated positive effect on the premium reserves will be offset somewhat by the 
positive effect of the bond portfolio. The expected capital at risk for the bond portfolio 
can be expressed as: 
 
  
1
i
n
med i i
FI RF FI FI
i
CR MV D
=
= −∆ ∗ ∗∑
 Where: 
  = Capital at risk for the bond portfolio due to interest FICR
  = Change in medium risk free interest rate for bond   
i
med
RF∆ i
 iFIMV  = Market value bond i  
  = Modified duration bond i  iFID
  = Represents bond i   i
  
The aggregated effect of the guarantee risk and interest rate risk related to the bond 
portfolio sum up to the total interest rate risk: 
  
int PR FCR CR CR= − I
)
 
 Where: 
  = Capital at risk for the interest rate intCR
 
If the discount rate equals the long term risk free rate for the premium reserves (as is 
intended in Solvency II and as we have assumed) and the change in interest rates are 
small22, the approximated value for capital at risk for the premium reserves can be used in 
the aggregated formula given a fall in the interest rates.  
:    
 int
1
( ) ( )
i
n
fall long long med i i
RF PR RF PR RF FI FI
i
CR r MV r D MV D
=
= −∆ ∗ ∗ − −∆ ∗ ∗∑   
                                                 
22 The reason this does not hold for larger changes is due to the bond price convexity, this means that the 
price of a bond does not change linearly with a change in yield. For further information see Bodie, Kane 
and Marcus (2005). 
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 Where: 
 int
fallCR  = Capital at risk for the interest rate given a fall in interest rates 
  
A rise in interest rates is equivalent, except that the value for both the premium reserve 
and the bond portfolio will decrease. As a result, the insurer gets the positive contribution 
from the premium reserves, not the bond portfolio. The capital at risk for interest rate 
given a rise in interest rate and the same assumption as above can therefore be described 
as: 
   
  int
1
( ) ( )
i
n
rise med i i long long
RF FI FI RF PR RF PR
i
CR MV D r MV r D
=
= ∆ ∗ ∗ − ∆ ∗ ∗∑
 Where: 
  = Capital at risk for the interest rate given a rise in interest rates int
riseCR
 
The solvency capital requirement for a rise in interest rates can be illustrated as follows: 
         
int int
1
max(0, ) max(0, ( ) ( ) )
i
n
rise rise med i i long long
RF FI FI RF PR RF PR
i
SCR CR MV D r MV r D
=
= = ∆ ∗ ∗ − ∆ ∗∑ ∗
∗
 Where: 
  = Solvency capital requirement for a rise in interest rates int
riseSCR
 
The formula for a fall in interest rate is found equivalently:                                                                                
 
int int
1
max(0, ) max(0, ( ) ( ) )
i
n
fall fall long long med i i
RF PR RF PR RF FI FI
i
SCR CR r MV r D MV D
=
= = −∆ ∗ ∗ − −∆ ∗∑
 
 Where: 
 int
fallSCR  = Solvency capital requirement for a fall in interest rates     
                
The total solvency capital requirement due to interest rates risk, as explained earlier, will 
be the maximum of the two possible outcomes: 
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 int int intmax( , )
fall riseSCR SCR SCR=  
 Where: 
  = Solvency capital requirement for interest rate risk intSCR
 
We have separated the fixed income portfolio of Vital according to the balance sheet 
outlined in chapter 4. We have assumed that the bonds have no coupons and that the 
durations and yields to maturity23 match the values given in the annual report. The 
durations have been modified with respective yield to maturity, and we have obtained the 
Modified Duration. We have used market values for both types of bonds (HTM and 
NHTM). Since the yields to maturity for bonds HTM include weights of book valued 
bonds in its value, we obtain a small error in our calculation. Adjusting for this error 
would give a higher yield which decreases the value of modified duration. Then the 
change in the value of the bonds HTM given a change in interest rates will decrease, so 
that the bond part of the net interest rate risk will be of smaller relative value. 
 
The capital requirement has been calculated so that the insurer is able to meet its 
obligations in the case of a permanent change of 0.7% for long term and 0.85% for 
medium term interest rates. In table 9 we have calculated the input values needed for the 
calculations of interest rate risk. 
Table 9  Interest rate risk (Numbers in Million NOK.)  
Bonds held to maturity D MD YTM MV MV * MD 
Norwegian 3.69 3.48 0.06 48 148 167594
Euro 5.94 5.6 0.06 6 366 35670
           
Bonds not held to maturity D MD YTM MV MV * MD 
Norwegian 3.68 3.6 0.02 47 293 170075
Euro 5.43 5.23 0.04 18 344 96008
Bonds - aggregation         469347
           
Premium reserve   MD   MV MV * MD 
   10   157 687 1576870
   15   148 801 2232015
    20   145 635 2912700
                                                 
23 A bonds yield to maturity is the interest rate that makes the present value of the future payments equal to 
the price of the bond (Bode, Kane and Marcus 2005). 
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 In table 10 we see how a fall in interest rates will affect the bond portfolio and the 
premium reserves of Vital.  
 
Table 10 Calculated net interest rate risk for Vital with a fall in interest rates  
(Numbers in Million NOK.)  
Interest rate fall 0,70% long term   Duration of liabilities 
Interest rate fall 0,85% med term 10 years 15 years 20 years 
Increase in premium reserve 11 038 15 624 20 389
Increase in value of bonds -3 989 -3 989 -3 989
Net interest rate risk 7 049 11 635 16 399
SCR(int.fall) 7 049 11 635 16 399
 
In table 11 we see how a rise in interest rates will affect the bond portfolio and the 
premium reserves of Vital.  
 
Table 11 Calculated net interest rate risk for Vital with a rise in interest rates 
(Numbers in Million NOK.) 
Interest rate rise 0,70% long term   Duration of liabilities 
Interest rate rise 0,85% med term 10 years 15 years 20 years 
Increase in premium reserve -11 038 -15 624 -20 389
Increase in value of bonds 3 989 3 989 3 989
Net interest rate risk -7 049 -11 635 -16 399
SCR(int.rise) 0 0 0
  
 The SCR equals the maximum of the rise and fall in interest rates. The SCR for the 
duration of 10 and 20 years is present for illustration purposes only. The SCR for the 
interest rate equals that of the duration of 15 years for the liabilities, in other words 11635 
million NOK.  
 
Table 12 Calculated net interest rate risk for Vital with a change in interest rates 
(Numbers in Million NOK.)  
Duration of liabilities 10 years 15 years 20 years 
Total SCR (interest rate risk) 7 049 11 635 16 399
 
The sensitivity to a fall in interest rates is high due to the high duration of the liabilities.  
 
There is a considerable discrepancy between the value of the liabilities and bonds with a 
change in interest rates. This is caused by the low duration of the bond portfolio which is 
considerably smaller than the duration of the liabilities. This is a duration mismatch. We 
can see from our table that the capital requirement falls significantly with a decrease of 
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the duration of the liabilities. Another factor that influences the result is that the value of 
the bond portfolio is lower than that of the liabilities.  
 
One possible source of error in our estimation of interest rate risk is related to the interest 
rate change. A change of the medium term interest rate of 0.85% does not automatically 
lead to a change in the long term rate of 0.7%. If we assume that the long rate change 
instead will be 0.5%, the solvency capital requirement decreases dramatically from 11635 
to 7171 Million NOK. One actual source of error is that Vital has a considerable portfolio 
of interest rate swaps24 which we have disregarded. Accounting for these, the interest rate 
risk would be reduced. Finally, lower interest rates decrease expected payments to the 
insured because of smaller expected bonuses. This means that we have overestimated the 
change in the market value of the premium reserves due to lower interest rates. In other 
words, we are overestimating the interest rate risk.  
 
8.1.3 Real estate risk 
 
CEIOPS is considering two different approaches for real estate risk; a factor based 
approach and a scenario based approach. In both of the approaches there will probably 
not be a distinction between direct real estate investments and indirect real estate 
investments. A factor-based approach for modeling the real estate risk capital could be 
done in a similar manner as the equity risk. The risk factors should then be calibrated 
according to a lognormal distribution and the parameters of yield and volatility can be 
derived from suitable market indices.  
 
If we look at the balance sheet of Vital we can see that in addition to the real estate 
portfolio there are real estate derivatives. The total position in real estate should include 
these investments. We have disregarded these derivatives. Since the real estate portfolio 
                                                 
24 An interest rate swap is a contract between two parties to make periodic payments to one another based 
on specific interest rates. The payment by one party can be based on a floating rate such as the NIBOR and 
the other party pays a fixed rate. Interest rate swaps are used by insurers to manage interest rate risk. For 
further information see Sundaresan (2002). 
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of Vital consists of both international and domestic investments it was not possible to 
find a suitable real estate index to use for the portfolio as we did not know enough about 
the investments. Consequently we have used a scenario approach based on the value of 
the real estate portfolio given in the balance sheet. To find the solvency capital 
requirement we have used a fall in prices of 8%.  
  
  ( )*RE RE RESCR PI MV= ∆
Where: 
RESCR  = Capital at risk for real estate 
REPI∆  = Change in the price index for real estate 
REMV  = Market value of the real estate portfolio 
 
Table 13 Calculation of the real estate risk (Numbers in Million NOK.) 
Market value real estate 22872
Change in price index 8%
SCR 1830
 
According to Vital the investments in real estate derivatives are hedging strategies. 
Consequently the capital at risk for the real estate portfolio will be lower than what we 
have calculated. However, we lack information regarding the derivatives and as a result 
we are not able to include these in our calculation. 
 
8.1.4 Aggregation of market risk 
 
We have now estimated the solvency capital requirement for the individual components 
of market risk. These will be used to calculate the aggregated solvency capital 
requirement for market risk. If all three risk elements are considered to be perfectly 
correlated, we can just sum up the individual parts to establish the aggregated one: 
 
   intmarket equity RESCR SCR SCR SCR= + +
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If the risk elements are considered to be uncorrelated the following aggregation will be 
correct.  
 
   2 2 2int( )market equity RESCR SCR SCR SCR= + + 1/ 2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
 
If the different risk elements have a correlation that is not perfect, we need to specify the 
correlation matrix. If this cannot be done in an appropriate way we should assume perfect 
correlation. 
 
  { ( ) }1/ 2int int
Re
equityee ei eR
market equity RE ie ii iR
Ri RR RE
SCR
SCR SCR SCR SCR SCR
SCR
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
The Dutch supervisory authorities assume a correlation between the interest rate risk and 
the sum of equity risk and real estate risk to be 0,8 for insurance companies 
(Kredittilsynet 2005). They assume the other risks to be uncorrelated. Although the 
approach by the Dutch authorities cannot automatically be adapted to the individual 
correlations, we will assume interest rate risk and respectively equity risk and real estate 
risk to be correlated with a factor of 0.8. The correlation between equity risk and real 
estate risk is assumed to be the same. Hence our calculation is based on the following: 
  
  { ( ) }1/ 2
1 0,8 0,8 9,1
9,1 11,6 1,8 0,8 1 0,8 11,6
0,8 0,8 1 1,8
marketSCR
⎛ ⎞⎛⎜ ⎟⎜= ⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠⎝
 
We get a solvency capital requirement for market risk of 21270 million NOK. The 
interval between uncorrelated and perfectly correlated risks is: 
    [ ]14896, 22584  
We see that correlations have a significant impact on the aggregated number for the 
market risk.  
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8.2 Underwriting risk 
 
In the insurance business there will always be a risk of the technical provisions not being 
large enough to meet the claims. This risk is called underwriting risk. In general, 
underwriting risk has its origin in one or more of the following four risk sources 
(CEIOPS 2nd call of advice): 
 
a) Volatility -   Because of the stochastic nature of mortality, policy lapses  
   and expenses, the actual future cash flows will fluctuate  
   around their statistical mean value. 
b) Catastrophe -   Beyond normal random fluctuations in mortality,   
   policy lapses and expenses extreme events may result in  
   high positive deviations from the statistical mean value. 
c) Level uncertainty -  Caused by misestimating the assumptions for all future  
   years. 
d) Trend uncertainty -  Arises from the difficulty in accurately assessing the future  
   direction of assumptions (e.g. rising life expectancy) in  
   future years. 
Which sources to consider depends on how the technical provisions are valued. Some of 
the risk sources might be considered in the risk margin.  
 
The capital requirement arising from underwriting risk is: 
 
  1 ( )
technical technicalRC VaR URα−=
 Where:  
  = Capital requirement arising from underwriting risk  technicalRC
 1VaR α−   = Risk measure with ruin probability α 
  = Technical/underwriting result of insurer technicalUR
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We can decompose underwriting risk into expense, lapse and mortality risk. As a result, 
the underwriting result can be split into three: 
 
  exptechnical mortality lapse enseUR UR UR UR= + +
 
There are different types of approaches to use when modeling underwriting risk. Given 
the heterogeneity of this type of risk, a scenario-based approach would be too complex, at 
least for a standard formula. CEIOPS recommends the use of factor-based models. They 
are easier to interpret and to generalize, but they are less able to predict catastrophic 
events. Since the impact of lapse risk on technical provisions may not be constant in time, 
a factor-based model might here lack ability of prediction. This risk should preferably be 
assessed by scenario techniques. We have outlined how to use a factor-based approach 
for expense and mortality risk, while lapse risk has been tackled somewhat differently. 
For the concrete solvency capital requirement calculation of Vital, we have not 
considered expense risk or lapse risk. As a consequence we have assumed that the 
underwriting result is fully related to mortality. The reasons behind this simplification 
will be explained later.  
 
8.2.1 Lapse risk 
 
Lapse risk occurs when an insurance undertaking experiences an unanticipated rate of 
policy lapses or terminations. The insurer has to pay the surrender value when a policy is 
terminated. In return the insured part of the technical provision is released. The insurer is 
at risk for both higher and lower lapse rates. Higher if the surrender value is higher than 
policy technical provisions, lower when the opposite occurs. When estimating the lapse 
risk, a factor-based model cannot easily be applied, especially not when lapse risk 
changes over the products life. A stress test is a better fit for the problem. The capital at 
risk can be estimated with the help of a specified factor greater or less than one. The 
factor is different for different types of policies. If lapses are doubled for policies in one 
class, the factor will be two. If they are reduced by one half, the factor will be one half. 
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Both higher and lower lapse rates need to be taken into account. Life contracts will 
therefore be divided in two; contracts where the technical provisions exceed the surrender 
values and of course the opposite case. As mentioned this will cover the risk of both 
lower and higher lapse rates. We also need to consider differences in types of policies: 
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 Where: 
  = Capital requirement lapse risk lapseCR
  = Surrender value start of period 0S
 ij  = Appropriately chosen factor for policy i   
  = Appropriately chosen factor for policy i  ik
 
The scenario where is not relevant for Vital due to Norwegian law. The total 
capital at risk for lapse risk is: 
0TP S< 0
  
   lapse lapse lapsetotal low highCR CR CR= +
 Where: 
  = Aggregated capital requirement lapse risk lapsetotalCR
 
The treatment of lapse risk in the SCR will be dependent on the structure of technical 
provisions. If surrender floors are considered in the calculation of the provisions, the 
lapse rate will not affect the remaining risk. We have assumed that this is the case of 
Vital, and that we do not need to include this capital at risk in our calculations of the total 
SCR. If this is not the case, CEIOPS recommends that unfavourable variations in lapse 
rates should be partly included in the risk margin. This also marginalizes the need for an 
explicit calculation of lapse risk. One problem with assuming the lapse risk as a part of 
 52
the risk margin is the future definition of solvency margin capital. This will include 
several of the former risk margin capitals. On the other hand, the new SCR shall take all 
risks into account.  
 
Due to the above arguments, and because Kredittilsynet quotes that the lapse risk of 
Norwegian insurance companies probably is insignificant (Kredittilsynet -Vedlegg 2005, 
page 117), we have not considered the lapse risk of Vital in our solvency capital 
requirement calculation. 
 
8.2.2 Expense risk 
 
The expense risk arises from the variation in the expenses related to administering the 
contractual obligations. In life insurance the contracts run for a long period, thus the 
expenses could be considerable. In general, with-profit businesses have lower expense 
risk. When determining the expense risk it is important to have a thorough understanding 
of an insurance undertakings expense structure. In general all future administrative 
costs25 should be reflected when determining the expenses and expense risk. Life 
insurance companies differ in size and structure, as well as in their spectre of products. 
This poses a great challenge in establishing a standard model. There will be a need for 
industry wide factors that can be applied to the provisions in each segment. It follows that 
the capital at risk for the expense will be calculated directly from the insurers’ expenses: 
 
   exp
1
*
n
ense
i
i
CR t E
=
= ∑ i
                                                
 Where: 
  = Capital at risk for expense expenseCR
   = Appropriately chosen factor/provisions for industry i  it
   = Future expenses related to industry  iE i
 
25 Expenses related to premiums and for administering investments. 
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  = Total expenses 
1
n
total
i
i
E E
=
=∑
 
The factor  should be chosen so that the administrative work on the contracts of the 
industries, receives its fair proportion of the total expenses.  
it
i
 
Often, but dependent on the regulatory regime, the expenses related to administering the 
contractual obligations are charged to the policyholders. This is done through an increase 
in the margin on future premiums paid by the customer, or by reducing bonuses. We have 
assumed that Vital also charges policyholders for the expenses, and as a result we have 
not analyzed the expense risk for Vital. 
 
8.2.3 Mortality risk 
 
Mortality is related to the length of life. If a company has a large enough number of 
policyholders the mortality risk can be diversified under certain assumptions. The capital 
requirement for mortality can be calculated using two different variables; technical 
provisions (TP), if the risk of longevity is relevant, and loss reserves (LR). By using these 
measures we generate a capital at risk to handle an expected possible loss with 
probability of α  given the values of today’s safety capital in underwriting risk, namely 
TP and LR. The calculation is as follows:  
 
  0 0max( * , * )
mortalityCR TP LRβ γ=
 Where: 
    = Capital at risk for mortality mortalityCR
     = Technical provisions at start of period 0TP
     = Loss reserve at start of period 
  = Quantile of relative mortality result in % of 
  = Quantile of relative mortality result in % of   
0LR
1 ( /
mortalityVaR UR TPαβ −= 0 )
0 )
0TP
1 ( /
mortalityVaR UR LRαγ −= 0LR
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To compute the mortality risk, we need to know the probability distribution of the 
relative mortality result in percentage of the volume measures (  and ), the 
expected values, 
0TP 0LR
/ 0
mortalityUR TP
µ and
/ 0
mortalityUR LR
µ  , and their variances, 
and . Then we can easily compute the quantiles 
0
2
/mortalityUR TP
σ
0
2
/mortalityUR LR
σ β  andγ . There are 
different plausible approaches to this matter. First, the supervisor might set all three 
parameters. This will result in industry-wide factors for beta and gamma. Second, the two 
last parameters can be estimated by the insurer. The basis of this estimation can be a 
company specific value or historic data. As a third alternative, the distribution can be 
regarded as a function of the size of the portfolio. The function is provided by the 
supervisor, which means that there will be an objective assessment of the volatility to the 
different homogenous groups, which is independent of a single company. Diversification 
effects of mortality risk follow the size of the portfolio. 
 
We have adapted the second approach to Vital, and used this to calculate the solvency 
capital requirement for mortality.  As stated above, we have assumed that the 
underwriting result is fully related to mortality. We have also assumed that 
( ) and ( ) follow a standard normal distribution. With these 
assumptions, and a probability of ruin equal 0.5%, the capital at risk for mortality is: 
0/
mortalityUR TP SCR
 
  99,5% 0 0 99,5% 0 0max( ( / )* , ( / )* )
mortality mortality mortalityCR VaR UR TP TP VaR UR LR LR=
 
From the annual report of Vital we found the loss reserve as the difference between 
premium reserves and technical provisions. The expected relative mortality result and 
their respective standard deviations have been estimated from the result of the last three 
years. Then we have simply calculated the VaR at 0.5% and multiplied with the 
respective factors. The calculation is illustrated in tables 14-17. 
 
 
 
 
 55
Table 14 The historic relative mortality result and the expected relative mortality 
result (Numbers in Million NOK) 
  2003 2004 2005 t=0 2006
Loss Reserve 4594 5208 9089 10867
Technical provisions 126192 140701 149790 169166
Underwriting result  1873 1333 1276 NA
        Mean 
UR/TP 0,014842 0,009474 0,008519 0,010945
UR/LR 0,407706 0,255952 0,140389 0,268016
 
 
Table 15 Standard deviation, VaR and expected capital at risk using the relative 
mortality result wrt TP (Numbers in Million NOK) 
Standard deviation UR/TP 0.003409
Cutoff UR/TP 0.002164
Standard normal cumulative PDF 0.005
β = VaR at 0.5% 0.008781
β * TP 1315
 
 
Table 16 Standard deviation, VaR and expected capital at risk using the relative 
mortality result wrt LR (Numbers in Million NOK) 
Standard deviation UR/LR 0,134066
Cutoff UR/LR -0,07731
Standard normal cumulative PDF 0,005
γ = VaR at 0,5% 0,345331
γ * LR 3139
 
Table 17 Solvency capital requirement due to mortality (Numbers in Million NOK) 
SCR = maks (β * TP,γ * LR) 3139
 
We see that the solvency capital requirement due to mortality  is 
3139 Million NOK. The ruin probability might be too strict, so the necessary solvency 
capital can be too high. In general the mortality risk, as with other underwriting risks, is 
often accounted for in the technical provisions or the risk margin. Adding  to our 
total capital requirement might therefore overestimate the need for solvent capital. As the 
formulas imply the reliability and practicality of the coefficients 
mortality
UWSCR SCR=
UWSCR
β  and γ  will also 
depend on the valuation of technical liabilities.  
 
 56
8.2.4 Aggregation of underwriting risk 
 
Analyzing underwriting risk on the basis of these three homogenous segments of the 
portfolio can lead to a problem of how the risks should be aggregated. It would be easy 
just to add the individual capital at risks, but then we take no diversification effects 
between the different risk groups into consideration. If such effects are present, this may 
lead to an overestimation of the total required capital for underwriting risk. The 
approaches to solve this problem are equivalent to the discussion in chapter 8.1.5. Due to 
earlier illustrations, and since we have only considered mortality risk in our calculation, 
there is no need for an elaborate discussion on this matter here. 
 
8.3 Credit risk 
 
Credit risk is the possibility that borrowers or counterparties could default in a financial 
transaction. Since insurers are large holders of bonds they are exposed to default risk. On 
the other hand they have investment grade26 strategies, meaning they hold bonds of a 
high credit rating thereby minimizing the default risk. There are several possible 
explanations as to why default could incur: macroeconomic factors, industry factors and 
company factors.  
 
There are two sources of information to credit risk; rating agencies (the three major 
agencies are Moody’s, Standard and Poor, and Fitch) and market prices for stocks and 
bonds. The rating agencies use historical data to produce their assessment of credit risk. 
The assessment is based on past default events. Rating agencies define default when a 
party fails to meet their contractual obligations.  
 
Probability of default (PD) is the single most important factor in assessing credit risk. 
There are several different ways of estimating the probability of default; historical data, 
bond prices, yield spreads and Mertons model. The probability of default is generally 
                                                 
26 The different rating classes and the definition of investment grade bonds are given in the appendix. 
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computed based on yield spreads and stock prices. Yield spreads give valuable 
information regarding the credit quality and are caused by different factors such as 
liquidity, taxes, contractual provisions and inflation risk. The yield spread is based on the 
difference between a given bond and a risk free bond which are presumed to be 
government bonds.  
 
A possibility for calculating the credit risk is using the PD for determining a capital 
requirement. This capital requirement would be based on a credit portfolio risk model for 
example the risk factor model of Gordy. Credit risk is a challenge to quantify since there 
are many explanations as to why default could incur and data is much scarcer, unlike 
market risk where you have daily data. Thus credit risk has longer horizons and the data 
for correlations, default probabilities and recovery rates is less frequent. 
  
CEIOPS does not expect insurers to develop credit rating models that will be 
implemented in the banking sector with the CRD27. As a result the approach for insurers 
will be relatively easy with the SCR standard formula and generalized assumptions about 
the input parameters. 
 
CEIOPS has proposed two formulas for the calculation of the credit risk. The first 
formula for credit risk is to be calculated on the basis of credit ratings from the rating 
agencies and yield spreads on bonds. The expected capital at risk for the bond portfolio 
can be expressed as: 
 
(1)  
1
( )
n
i
credit i FI i
i
CR CS D l
=
= ∗∑ ∗
                                                
 
 
The second formula is for cases where a credit rating does not exist. Then the calculation 
is based solely on credit spreads and the result will lead to a higher capital requirement.  
 
 
27 The new Basel Accord will be implemented in the Europe Union via the Capital Requirements Directive 
(CRD).
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(2)  
1
n
i
credit i FI i
i
CR CS D l
=
≈ ∗∑ ∗
 
Where the following are defined for the two equations: 
creditCR   = Capital requirement for bond portfolio due to credit risk 
iCS   = Credit spread for bond class i  
iD   = Duration for bond class  i
il   = Factor for the risk class i  
 
A large part of the bond portfolio for Vital consists of bonds with little or no default 
probability. These are government bonds. If we look at the formulas that are proposed 
they will equal zero for government bonds as the credit spread for bonds is calculated as 
the difference between a given bond and government bonds. We have assumed that the 
risky part of the bond portfolio has the same relative weights of domestic and 
international bonds as the total bond portfolio. The bonds are split according to the 
balance sheet in chapter 4. Since most life insurers have investment grade strategies we 
have assumed that the bonds with credit risk are investment grade with a single A rating, 
and we have used a credit spread28 of 1.4%. The factor we have set for the risk class is 
arbitrarily set on the basis of the example in Consultative paper 7. On the basis of 
formula (1) we have then calculated the capital requirement. 
 
Table 18 Calculation of credit risk (Numbers in Million NOK.) 
  N. HTM E. HTM N. HTM E. NHTM 
Market value of bonds 20588 2722 20450 7932
Factor 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Duration 3.69 5.94 3.68 5.43
Credit spread in percent 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
Capital requirement percent of market 
value 0.031 0.050 0.031 0.046
Capital requirement  638 136 632 362
         
SCR 1768       
  
                                                 
28 The table for the credit spreads we have used is given in the appendix. 
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The solvency capital requirement for credit risk, , is 1768 Million NOK. This risk 
is relatively small compared to the market risk. Moreover, insurance companies are 
exposed to downgrades of bonds that affect fund volatility and asset values, and in 
recessions, bond ratings will be lowered and consequently credit spreads will increase. As 
a result the value of the assets covering the SCR will decline (KPMG 2002). 
creditSCR
 
A problem with the calculation of the credit risk is the availability of data regarding the 
bond portfolio of Vital. Therefore we had to make general assumptions about the bonds. 
If we had had more information about the bonds we could have used a VaR approach to 
find the capital at risk, which would have given us correlations and as a consequence the 
benefits of diversification (if there were any).  
 
8.4 Operational risk 
 
A proper definition of operational risk is in order to understand what needs to be 
measured. The following definition is from CEIOPS: 
 
Operational risk is the danger of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems, or from external events. Internal failures include 
management incompetence, fraud, criminal intentions and errors in systems and 
processes 
www.ceiops.org 
 
Technical errors may be caused by computer failure or a process in the back-office. 
Operational risk can also be the source of market or credit risk. Human errors can be 
related to fraud or inadequate procedures or control.  
 
 The quantification of operational risk is still in its infancy. Hence there are no developed 
or established methods for quantifying the operational risk. A major problem with the 
quantifications is the availability of data. Unlike market and credit risk where the 
information needed for quantification is public information, operational risk is internal to 
 60
the firm. Firms are not in general interested in sharing the information on their failings 
and therefore it is hard to develop a general model.  Firms need to establish and maintain 
large databases, and based on these establish loss distributions to calculate the relevant 
risk. Operational risk occurrences fall into two categories: frequent but modest losses and 
infrequent ones that incur substantial losses. As a consequence of this it will take time 
before a formal VaR model for operational risk charges.  
 
Meanwhile, shortcuts have been developed where the charge for operational risk is a 
percentage of a relevant variable, this type of model is a factor model. The model needs 
to be based on a measure; the possibilities for Solvency II could be gross premiums, 
technical provisions or gross income. The measure should provide an assessment of the 
volume of business for the undertaking. Another issue is how many years to include in 
the calculation. If the business is rapidly evolving historical numbers may not be of much 
interest and will not reflect the current business. The operational risk may vary from the 
different business lines and therefore it might be necessary to treat the lines differently. 
This needs further analysis. The factor models may not be able to predict the operational 
risk related to extreme events.  
 
For Basel II, the bank of international settlements (BIS) developed a framework for the 
operational risk which will be adapted to Solvency II. From the banking sector CEIOPS 
has suggested two possible factor based approaches that could be adapted: the basic 
indicator approach (BIA) or the standardized approach (TSA). 
 
The simplest approach is the BIA where the capital requirement is calculated based on 
gross income29 as the volume measure. The gross income has not yet been defined for 
insurance companies in Norway in connection with the new framework. We will use 
gross premiums written + net financial income as our volume measure. The capital 
                                                 
29 For the definition of gross income for the banking sector in connection with Basel refer to paragraph §2-2 
in Forskrift om minstekrav til kapitaldekning for operasjonell risiko. 
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charge is then simply calculated as a fixed percentage30 of the average gross income over 
a specific number of years (historic numbers): 
 
1
T
BIA
OP i
i
CR GI
T
α
=
= ∑  
 
Where:  
BIA
OPCR  = Capital charge under the BIA 
iGI  = Annual gross income in year t 
T  = The number of years for which the gross income is positive  
α  = The industry wide level of the indicator set by the BIS at 15% 
 
The second approach is the TSA. This approach takes into consideration eight different 
business lines and applies a factor to the different business lines. The factor is yet to be 
set for the insurance sector, for the banking sector31 it varies from 12 to 18%. The TSA 
allows a negative gross income to offset positive income within the different business 
lines. The max operator limits the possible offset to operational risk. 
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Where: 
TSA
OPCR  = The capital charge under the standardized approach; 
,i tGI   = Annual gross income for year t in business line i 
iβ  = The industry-wide level of the indicator for business line i,  
 
The calculation of the operational risk is given in table 19. 
 
                                                 
30 The percentage α needs to be set for the insurance sector. In the banking sector BIS has set it at 15%. 
31 The factor is set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
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Table 19 Capital charge for Vital based on the basic indicator approach  
  (Numbers in Million NOK.)  
  2005 2004 2003
Premium income 22057 19096 14046
Net financial income  13888 10666 13080
Gross income 35945 29762 27126
     
Α 15%   
T 3   
     
SCR 4642     
 
The solvency capital requirement for operational risk, , is 4642 Million NOK. 
To compare the amount we can use the Basel framework as a reference. The BIS 
committee estimated at first that the operational risk should be roughly 20% of the total 
capital requirement for banks. However, after further research it was suggested it should 
be about 12%. The partial risk contribution of our calculations is given in table 20. 
operationalSCR
 
8.5  Aggregation of total risk 
 
Aggregating total risk is equivalent to the aggregation of total market risk. Which method 
to use, depends on the correlation assumed between the different types of risks. In the 
Danish traffic light system the different risk categories are believed to perfectly 
correlated, while in the Swedish system they are assumed to be uncorrelated. The Dutch 
system assumes most risks to be uncorrelated. The exception is correlation between 
interest rate risk and the sum of equity and real estate risk. This correlation is estimated to 
be 0.8 for insurance companies. Since we have considered these correlations in the 
aggregation of market risk in 9.1, we leave them here. There is no point using 
correlations that are not estimated in a satisfying way. Probably the best choice of use for 
aggregating total risk is either to assume perfect correlations or no correlation at all: 
 
Formula for perfect correlation: 
   
total market UW credit operationalSCR SCR SCR SCR SCR= + + + +   
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Formula for no correlation: 
 
  { }1/ 22 2 2 2total market UW credit operationalSCR SCR SCR SCR SCR= + + +  
 
We will assume perfect correlations between the different risk categories. This might 
give a capital requirement higher than what would be the true measure of risks. The total 
solvency capital requirement will be: 
 
  = 21270 marketSCR
 
totalSCR  = 21270 + 3139 + 1768 + 4642 = 30819 
 
An illustration of the partial risk elements contribution to total risk is given in table 20. 
 
Table 20 Overview of the different risks 
Risk element SCR Risk contribution 
Equity  9119 0.30
Interest rate 11635 0.38
Real estate 1830 0.06
Underwriting 3139 0.10
Credit 1768 0.06
Operational 4642 0.15
Total 30819   
New solvency margin capital 18804   
 
We see that the total aggregated solvency capital requirement greatly exceeds the new 
solvency margin capital. There are several explanations for this. First, as explained in this 
chapter, our simplifications generally overestimate the risks. Second, our approach is 
based on a standard type of model. An internal model might estimate the risk more 
accurately and result in a lower SCR. Also, the solvency of Vital might not satisfy the 
new requirement. To investigate this theory further, we will in chapter 10.3 use a scenario 
approach to estimate the risk of Vital. 
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8.6 Internal/partly internal/standard models 
 
A central issue of Solvency II is the use of internal models in setting the SCR. The use of 
internal models forces the insurance companies to show more caution when determining 
their capital needs. This increases the need for transparency and requirements for 
disclosure. It also stresses the need for early warnings (as in stress tests – see Pillar 2).  
Internal models should also allow the determination of the marginal contribution of each 
risk to the total amount of risk. This helps separating the different investment areas and 
enhances more detailed risk management.  
 
The overall goal of internal models is to give as accurate a picture as possible of a 
company’s risk exposure. Though there are limitations to such models. Internal models 
are based on different theoretical risk models, such as the stochastic nature of interest 
rates and equity. Empirical behavior, on the other hand, often differs from the 
theoretically assumed nature of risk. One result can be that the probability of large losses 
is underestimated. This might indicate a more positive picture than the actual situation. A 
good way to compensate for this modeling failure can be a regular use of stress testing, 
both for insurers and supervisors. We will elaborate on this in the discussion of Pillar 2. 
 
The idea is that where it is possible the undertaker will develop its own internal model 
which will be best suited to the undertakers risk profile. Subsequently they will have a 
capital requirement best suited to their level of risk and will be able to have a lower level 
of capital than what the standard model would produce. This of course will depend on the 
cost-benefit for the undertaker. The financial supervisory authority has to approve the 
model. 
 
It is important that the same types of risk measures to calculate the Solvency capital 
requirement (SCR) can be used in both the standard formula and internal models. If this 
is not the case, there will be an incentive to move from the standard formula to internal 
models. A partial model will not necessarily be transparent. The use of TailVaR will 
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smooth the transition from the standard formula to internal models and make partial 
models more transparent.  
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9 Pillar 2 
 
The key principles of Pillar 2 are supervisory review, risk management and internal 
control.  
 
9.1 Supervisory review of capital adequacy 
 
A challenge for the supervisory regime is the instability of financial markets. The 
developments after year 2000 made an entire sector face problems fulfilling the 
prudential requirements. This showed the harm of a pro-cyclical solvency capital 
requirement system and emphasized the need for coordinated supervisory action. 
Regulative actions have often been used too late, and solving this is of great importance 
in Solvency II. This can only be done if important aspects of the supervisory review 
process are harmonized among member countries.  
 
The extreme complexity of insurance business and risk management techniques makes it 
difficult for any formula or model to completely estimate the risks and requirements. This 
emphasizes the need for a supervisory review process. The interaction from supervisors is 
intended to create an active dialogue between insurers and supervisors, and thereby 
harmonize the relationship between risks assumed and the financial strength of the 
insurer. 
 
The supervisory review process of the new Solvency regime will encourage insurers to 
develop and apply or practice better risk management techniques in monitoring and 
managing their risks. Internal models are of great interest, but they should not only be 
used for the matter of measuring regulatory capital. An internal model should also be 
used in the day to day management and thereby help the decision making process. 
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9.2 Internal control 
 
In many of today’s insurance companies the risk management function is spread 
throughout the organization. The need for transparency of different risk functions within 
insurance undertaking increases, and as a result Solvency II will tie the ultimate 
responsibility at board level.   
 
The range of insurance business has changed over the years. An insurer is responsible for 
setting up a control environment that fully reflects this range. Switching from a bond-
equity portfolio to a derivatives-equity portfolio will increase the complexity of the back-
office-function. This will also increase the need of an internal control function to reduce 
the operational risk.  
 
Figure 9 Organisational setup for risk management 
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9.3 Stress testing 
 
Stress tests can be an important tool in assisting the supervisor and the insurer to manage 
risks and maintain enough capital. They are designed to estimate potential economic 
losses in extreme but plausible situations. This is different from most internal risk models 
that are probability based through advanced financial methods. Internal models are also 
based on a greater amount of data. The idea with stress tests is that they should pick up 
changes that are not captured in an internal, stochastic and more complex VaR model. 
Regulators have realized that a VaR number is not a sufficient measure for risk. Hence 
stress tests can be a necessary supplement to internal models in order to determine the 
consequences of extreme (tail) events. This is particularly important in consideration with 
market risk. The Basel Committee released a paper “The application of Basel II to 
trading activities and the treatment of double default effects” where it was stated that 
banks must have a system for stress-testing in place. The Basel Committee proposes 
stress testing for the crash in the equity market in 1987 where different markets were 
disturbed and the correlations across them changed (Dimson and Marsh 1996). Stress 
testing will also be of utmost importance for Solvency II. 
 
There are different types of stress tests. One can be a sensitivity analysis to changes in 
economic variables; another one can analyze a scenario, for instance a catastrophe of 
some type. Stress testing is a widespread practice for gathering market risk information. 
It is normally conducted on a portfolio. The challenge is to perform a stress test on all 
portfolios and aggregate the potential losses and find the correlations among them. To 
perform a stress test there will have to be some guessing in order to find the potential 
catastrophes and it is difficult to imagine every possible scenario. A risk manager could 
run a large number of scenarios and then determine a capital requirement related to the 
scenario. However, an undertaking cannot hold a capital level for every plausible and 
implausible scenario. Therefore a probability should be attached to the different scenarios 
and then the firm decides which scenario it should take into account when determining 
the required level of capital. Stress testing is more difficult the larger the company is. The 
numbers of portfolios increases and different portfolios and risks have different time 
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horizons. Market risks materialize quickly (days or weeks). Credit risk takes more time to 
take effect (months or years). 
 
When creating a stress test, it is important that it relates to the decision making process of 
the individual company. An important goal is to make risks more transparent. With the 
help of reference scenarios or early warning indicators, there is also a possibility to create 
a standard of stress tests that makes it possible to compare information from different 
insurance companies. The use of stress tests has increased the risk awareness of the life 
insurance industry. 
 
In Solvency II, stress tests will most likely be used for supervision purposes and the result 
of the stress test will not be considered as a binding level of capital. The tests will in 
general lead to a more prudent capital requirement than the SCR. As long as a company 
satisfies the capital requirement of the stress test, it will be sufficient to report the stress 
test results to the financial supervisory authorities twice a year. If not, more frequent 
reporting can be demanded by the authorities. The frequency will depend on the size of 
mismatch between capital requirements and actual buffer capital. The supervisory action 
that will be taken when failing to satisfy the stress tests requirements still needs to be 
determined. 
 
In Denmark and Sweden they have introduced the so-called traffic-light system. It is 
represented by two stress test scenarios, red and yellow, in order to assess the financial 
strength of the life insurance companies. In the Danish stress tests, the yellow scenario 
requires the life insurers to calculate the effects of more extreme, but plausible 
circumstances. It includes a drop in equity prices of 30%, a change in long term interest 
rates of 100 basis points and a decrease in real estate prices of 12%. The red scenario 
includes a drop in equity prices of 12 percent, a decrease in real estate prices of 8 percent 
and a change in the long, medium and short rates of 70, 85 and 100 basis points. 
 
If the financial strength is not sufficient in the case of the yellow scenario and red 
scenario, the policyholders' interests are considered to be in danger. In addition if the firm 
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fails the yellow scenario it is required to report the calculations to the Financial 
Supervisory Authorities every third month. If the firm fails the red scenario the situation 
will be analyzed and if necessary the firm might be told to decrease its risk profile. 
 
We have used the Danish stress test to assess the financial strength of Vital. The risks 
related to assets and liabilities are to be calculated based on a realistic or a fair valuation 
which corresponds to using market values. This we have outlined in previous chapters. 
The Danish system also uses an adjustment to the solvency margin capital. This 
adjustment is similar to the one we outlined in chapter 8.5, and we will use this new 
solvency margin capital when assessing the stress test results for Vital. Our approach is 
based on the red scenario and it is equivalent to a procedure used by Kredittilsynet32.  
 
As calculated under Pillar 1, an increase in the interest rates will not lead to an increased 
capital at risk for Vital. Therefore we have only considered a fall in the interest rates for 
the stress test. The premium reserves have duration of approximately 15 years and 
consequently we will use the long term interest rate change of 70 basis points. Table 21 
shows the change in the value of the premium reserves based on a decrease in the 
discounting rate, from 4% to 3.3% (70 basis points). In addition the table shows the 
change in the value of the bonds based on a change of 85 basis points in the interest rates. 
The sum is the net interest rate risk. 
 
Table 21 Calculated net interest rate risk for Vital (Numbers in Million NOK.) 
    Duration of liabilities 
  10 years 15 years 20 years 
Increase in premium reserve 11038 15624 20389
Increase in value of bonds -3989 -3989 -3989
Net interest rate risk 7049 11635 16399
  
The explanation for the interest rate risk and the change in values of the bonds and 
premium reserves were given in chapter 8.1.2. The net interest rate risk is one of three 
components for the stress test. The other two are equity risk and real estate risk. These are 
calculated based on the changes in value as explained above. The effect of the three 
                                                 
32 Kredittilsynet 2005, page 44-67. 
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components make up the stress test and the aggregated result of the red scenario is given 
in Table 22 below. We have disregarded any derivatives position as well as a risk 
contribution from credit and underwriting. 
 
Table 22 Aggregate effect of the red scenario for the liabilities and assets 
(Numbers in Million NOK.) 
    Duration of liabilities 
  10 years 15 years 20 years 
Net interest rate risk 7049 11635 16399
Stock price risk 3907 3907 3907
Real estate risk 1830 1830 1830
Sum effect of stress test 12786 17372 22136
 
To adapt the aggregated effect of the red scenario on the solvency capital requirement, 
the Danish traffic light system suggests adjusting the solvency capital requirement value 
by 4% of the premium reserves. This is equivalent to the calculation of the solvency 
capital requirement under Solvency I. There is also a correction element and this is to 
avoid that the investment risk is calculated twice. We have calculated the investment risk 
fully in table 22, but this is claimed to be considered indirectly in the calculation of the 
solvency marginal capital with today’s rules. How intuitive this formula is can be 
debated, but we will not elaborate on this matter. Table 23 takes the correction element 
into consideration. The existing solvency margin requirement for Vital is given in the 
annual report. 
 
Table 23 The part of the solvency margin requirement after the scenario which is to 
be included in the capital requirement calculated in the red scenario 
(Numbers in Million NOK.) 
    Duration of liabilities 
  10 years 15 years 20 years 
Existing solvency margin requirement 7130 7130 7130
4% of the increase in PR 442 625 816
Solvency margin requirement after scenario 7572 7755 7946
       
3% of PR before scenario 4749 4749 4749
3% of interest rate guarantee 331 469 612
Correction element 5080 5218 5361
Part of solvency margin requirement after        
scenario to be calculated in stress test 2491 2537 2585
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The values generated in table 23 are the part of the solvency capital requirement which is 
related to risk elements not considered in the stress test, given regulation as of today. 
Therefore we have added these numbers to the capital requirement calculated from the 
stress test. This has given us the total capital requirement of the red scenario stress test in 
table 24. 
 
Table 24 Total solvency capital requirement of the red scenario for Vital   
  (Numbers in Million NOK.) 
    Duration of liabilities 
  10 years 15 years 20 years 
Solvency margin capital  before scenario 18804 18804 18804
       
Sum effect of stress test 12786 17372 22136
Part of solvency margin requirement after        
scenario to be calculated in stress test 2491 2537 2585
Solvency capital requirement after scenario 15278 19909 24721
       
Result of red scenario 3526 -1105 -5917
 
As we can see Vital would have problems meeting the capital requirement from the stress 
test if the three events took place at the same time given the realistic assumption of 15 
years about the duration of liabilities. We see the importance of the duration of the 
liabilities for the stress test scenario. The solvency capital requirement calculated in the 
red scenario is much smaller than the one we got from our factor based approach in 
chapter 8. However, we have disregarded underwriting-, credit- and operational risk in 
the stress test.  
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10 Pillar 3 
 
The Pillar 3 objective of public disclosure is a necessary and important complement to 
the minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review of capital 
adequacy (Pillar 2). This emphasis on public disclosure is a benefit not only to market 
participants and other traditional users of the public disclosures, but to supervisors as 
well. The reasoning behind this is that enhanced public disclosure itself strengthens 
supervision through increased market discipline - the companies that manage risk 
effectively are rewarded, while those that do not are penalized. Another advantage of the 
public disclosure is avoiding an increase in regulation that would come as insurance 
companies become more complex. 
 
In practice, insurance undertakings will have to ensure that information required by Pillar 
1 and 2 is available for supervisory purposes. This information will partly be publicly 
disclosed and partly made available for supervisor only. The result is increased 
transparency. Rating companies will be able to provide more accurate ratings for 
investors, and supervisory agencies will have an easier job to assess and control the risk 
in the insurance industry. The information will be retrospective, but also prospective, in 
terms of sensitivity analysis, and stress testing. 
 
 Another beneficial effect of the increased disclosure is that insurers’ focus on the 
management of risk increases. The market will react to changes in risks at a very early 
stage and this will give an incentive for insures to focus on effective economic risk 
management by hedging the risks taken. High risks can place insurers under severe strain 
and it will be easier for the market to discover a deteriorated risk profile at an early stage. 
 
The prospective part of the information, namely results of sensitivity analysis and stress 
tests (indicators) is important as they would enable market participants to evaluate and 
compare the risks taken on by insurers. This will strengthen both the market disciplining 
mechanism and the incentive for risk management. 
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 The results of sensitivity analysis show the insurer's sensitivity to minor changes in 
important parameters. A stress test will paint the picture of the insurer's ability to deal 
with tail-events. It is easier to disclose the results of sensitivity analysis to the market 
because tail-events are more unrealistic than small changes in a parameter. In fact, market 
participants, analysts and other users of information should require the results of 
standardized sensitivity analysis to be disclosed, by doing this they can evaluate and 
compare the risks taken on by insurers. Disclosing these standardized parameters should 
however not prevent insurers from disclosing individually designed sensitivity analysis 
and stress tests to further describe their risk profile. 
 
As a final point, the new Solvency II standards will be adapted to the new IASB rules. 
They will increase the level of information going out to the public. One difficult aspect 
then is the level of confidentiality. 
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11 Conclusion 
 
We have explained Solvency II and outlined how a given life insurance company can 
adapt to the different aspects of this new regulatory framework. The framework is built 
around a three pillar structure and its ultimate goal is to make life insurers robust enough 
to face the future. We have provided a thorough explanation of possible outcomes given 
the new regulatory regime, and we have exemplified using Vital.  
 
In Solvency II, the valuation of assets and liabilities should comply with a fair value 
approach. We used the modified balance of Vital in a risk based manner to estimate the 
solvency capital requirement. We also calculated a new solvency margin capital. 
 
The Pillar 1 calculations were simple factor- and scenario based approaches. This 
resulted in a considerable increase in the capital requirement for Vital, even when 
comparing to the new solvency margin capital. This was to be expected, but the size of 
the difference was larger than predicted. We have found several reasons for the high 
numbers: 
1. We have not considered that Vital has considerable derivatives related to hedging 
the interest and equity risk. Taking these into account would naturally entail a 
large reduction in the capital requirement. 
2. Our approach is very comparable to a standard model. Insurance companies will 
have an incentive to develop tailored models for their undertaking. A reduction in 
the solvency capital requirement could be obtained with better modeling 
techniques as this would lead to more accurate assessments of risks. In addition, 
more realistic correlations could result in diversification effects. The more 
advanced approaches are not yet developed in detail but they will need 
considerable investigation.  
3. The capital requirement is very interest rate sensitive. A reduction in the duration 
gap between bonds and premium reserves would lead to a significant reduction in 
the capital requirement. A solution to meeting the capital requirements of 
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Solvency II will be to change the composition of the bond portfolio by buying 
bonds with a higher duration. As a result there could be an incentive to change the 
asset structure of an insurance undertaking, and the demand for long term bonds 
might rise with the implementation of Solvency II. 
4. The models we have used are still in a preliminary stage and will need further 
testing to be approved as sufficient measures. In general our approach 
overestimated the risks. This is discussed in further detail in chapter 8. 
 
Even though the solvency capital requirement increased, this approach also emphasises 
an expansion of the solvency margin capital, involving an inclusion of the adjustment 
reserve and parts of the loss reserve. There still is no exact approach to use.  
 
The discussion of Pillar 2 included testing the plausibility of our estimations under Pillar 
1. We adapted a Danish stress test scenario to Vital. Vital still came out with red 
numbers. 
  
We finished our discussion by emphasising the importance of the Pillar 3 objective of 
public disclosure. 
 
Working with this thesis has revealed a spectre of interesting problems. There are many 
issues that would need to be studied in further depth and researched more thoroughly.  
We now feel we have a good understanding of the life insurance business and the 
Solvency II framework.  
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Appendix A Time series 
 
 
Source Datastream Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley 
Start 17.5.2001       
End 17.5.2006       
Frequency Daily Daily Daily Daily 
Name 
OSLO EXCHANGE ALL 
SHARE-  MSCI EUROPE -  
MSCI NORTH 
AMERICA - MSCI FAR EAST - 
 TOT RETURN IND (~U$) Gross Index Gross Index Gross Index 
Code OSLOASH(RI)~U$       
CURRENCY U$ USD USD USD 
17.5.2001 20.65 3,980.17 3,961.55 4,209.51
18.5.2001 21.14 3,997.14 4,016.24 4,274.41
21.5.2001 21.45 3,989.38 4,007.97 4,278.06
22.5.2001 21.24 3,934.22 3,949.01 4,337.18
23.5.2001 21.02 3,924.86 3,963.19 4,320.08
24.5.2001 21.03 3,901.39 3,918.36 4,281.60
25.5.2001 21.25 3,917.21 3,918.70 4,242.50
28.5.2001 21.23 3,871.69 3,889.31 4,293.75
29.5.2001 20.89 3,834.55 3,831.99 4,208.88
30.5.2001 20.80 3,807.21 3,855.90 4,199.32
31.5.2001 20.52 3,795.32 3,874.39 4,189.36
1.6.2001 20.36 3,814.02 3,895.65 4,183.55
4.6.2001 20.38 3,858.23 3,940.15 4,153.86
5.6.2001 20.51 3,826.56 3,900.05 4,148.70
6.6.2001 20.54 3,830.58 3,918.81 4,172.04
7.6.2001 20.50 3,817.00 3,883.04 4,163.03
8.6.2001 20.53 3,754.99 3,855.34 4,100.00
11.6.2001 20.14 3,709.94 3,858.81 4,006.09
12.6.2001 19.79 3,751.61 3,818.80 4,003.59
13.6.2001 20.19 3,735.62 3,755.26 4,005.38
14.6.2001 20.01 3,718.00 3,732.88 3,961.61
15.6.2001 19.91 3,683.14 3,715.25 3,935.09
18.6.2001 19.94 3,680.60 3,728.09 3,923.49
19.6.2001 20.23 3,645.21 3,766.85 3,911.64
20.6.2001 20.01 3,652.52 3,806.87 3,965.36
21.6.2001 19.88 3,669.85 3,771.28 3,994.25
22.6.2001 19.93 3,692.57 3,749.43 3,970.33
25.6.2001 19.96 3,637.49 3,738.93 3,977.72
26.6.2001 19.68 3,632.31 3,722.93 3,950.79
27.6.2001 19.70 3,637.60 3,771.04 3,898.54
28.6.2001 19.40 3,665.05 3,765.34 3,961.18
29.6.2001 19.52 3,717.14 3,806.78 3,944.81
2.7.2001 19.46 3,672.62 3,799.45 3,955.32
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3.7.2001 19.50 3,644.82 3,798.77 3,925.14
4.7.2001 19.45 3,585.31 3,749.75 3,881.79
5.7.2001 19.23 3,539.22 3,664.82 3,802.65
6.7.2001 19.26 3,554.18 3,693.97 3,783.23
9.7.2001 19.39 3,557.09 3,643.71 3,822.76
10.7.2001 19.29 3,530.54 3,640.03 3,792.70
11.7.2001 19.10 3,543.48 3,725.48 3,856.81
12.7.2001 19.04 3,562.45 3,748.94 3,818.80
13.7.2001 18.89 3,556.38 3,711.71 3,809.12
16.7.2001 18.78 3,511.80 3,750.08 3,764.46
17.7.2001 18.42 3,542.97 3,729.64 3,717.79
18.7.2001 18.67 3,592.77 3,751.27 3,724.73
19.7.2001 18.98 3,576.00 3,737.76 3,738.22
20.7.2001 19.00 3,571.52 3,676.39 3,624.13
23.7.2001 19.16 3,544.67 3,618.38 3,667.71
24.7.2001 19.06 3,516.00 3,674.40 3,705.68
25.7.2001 19.01 3,535.67 3,706.58 3,701.32
26.7.2001 19.14 3,589.50 3,713.34 3,687.06
27.7.2001 19.25 3,635.16 3,711.65 3,614.63
30.7.2001 19.39 3,674.58 3,730.92 3,696.15
31.7.2001 19.38 3,701.55 3,743.95 3,729.57
1.8.2001 19.57 3,715.23 3,759.91 3,828.87
2.8.2001 19.70 3,695.48 3,742.13 3,788.76
3.8.2001 19.61 3,675.38 3,700.93 3,779.42
6.8.2001 19.47 3,669.21 3,715.83 3,798.60
7.8.2001 19.30 3,623.45 3,652.13 3,786.60
8.8.2001 19.14 3,600.89 3,652.06 3,695.06
9.8.2001 19.27 3,598.68 3,671.59 3,718.45
10.8.2001 19.29 3,629.11 3,672.15 3,661.45
13.8.2001 19.30 3,669.85 3,655.17 3,770.51
14.8.2001 19.36 3,699.36 3,628.77 3,813.31
15.8.2001 19.47 3,666.29 3,641.60 3,750.15
16.8.2001 19.47 3,622.50 3,578.44 3,736.28
17.8.2001 19.36 3,609.96 3,606.22 3,684.82
20.8.2001 19.10 3,649.78 3,561.84 3,716.40
21.8.2001 19.26 3,669.89 3,586.30 3,748.84
22.8.2001 19.31 3,650.09 3,576.04 3,701.55
23.8.2001 19.00 3,704.67 3,646.33 3,692.74
24.8.2001 19.24 3,696.17 3,628.99 3,720.40
27.8.2001 19.14 3,653.18 3,574.51 3,696.18
28.8.2001 19.11 3,649.81 3,531.38 3,656.65
29.8.2001 18.98 3,575.73 3,469.53 3,602.46
30.8.2001 18.90 3,579.84 3,484.95 3,595.10
31.8.2001 18.75 3,534.74 3,484.82 3,516.66
3.9.2001 18.59 3,524.28 3,490.45 3,597.50
4.9.2001 18.62 3,468.33 3,489.87 3,525.73
5.9.2001 18.67 3,399.79 3,412.74 3,508.47
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6.9.2001 18.60 3,361.74 3,348.94 3,499.28
7.9.2001 18.48 3,317.25 3,374.20 3,405.13
10.9.2001 17.97 3,141.86 3,368.36 3,471.61
11.9.2001 18.74 3,189.87 3,369.45 3,228.38
12.9.2001 17.68 3,231.80 3,369.70 3,269.87
13.9.2001 17.63 3,108.82 3,365.87 3,383.54
14.9.2001 17.55 3,185.06 3,201.20 3,231.76
17.9.2001 17.48 3,158.68 3,183.91 3,267.41
18.9.2001 17.33 3,111.98 3,134.29 3,349.65
19.9.2001 17.12 2,983.66 3,037.42 3,325.12
20.9.2001 16.38 2,873.65 2,983.82 3,208.35
21.9.2001 15.35 3,021.23 3,102.89 3,196.29
24.9.2001 15.74 3,082.52 3,127.93 3,229.61
25.9.2001 16.08 3,121.07 3,114.85 3,177.91
26.9.2001 16.07 3,158.16 3,147.27 3,160.22
27.9.2001 16.04 3,222.64 3,216.24 3,229.78
28.9.2001 16.23 3,172.44 3,211.35 3,263.59
1.10.2001 16.02 3,198.43 3,249.71 3,312.68
2.10.2001 15.97 3,223.83 3,312.10 3,258.61
3.10.2001 15.99 3,309.43 3,301.79 3,336.75
4.10.2001 16.06 3,309.53 3,306.61 3,338.19
5.10.2001 16.03 3,308.72 3,280.89 3,338.64
8.10.2001 15.92 3,298.14 3,261.43 3,270.93
9.10.2001 16.10 3,353.54 3,336.11 3,231.14
10.10.2001 16.20 3,365.02 3,387.01 3,305.16
11.10.2001 16.46 3,360.81 3,369.87 3,363.70
12.10.2001 16.46 3,298.39 3,365.15 3,334.16
15.10.2001 16.15 3,333.33 3,388.41 3,343.39
16.10.2001 16.26 3,396.66 3,324.55 3,383.24
17.10.2001 16.63 3,334.33 3,300.53 3,313.49
18.10.2001 16.27 3,265.94 3,316.41 3,314.63
19.10.2001 15.91 3,293.66 3,367.05 3,306.33
22.10.2001 16.03 3,358.96 3,350.92 3,354.65
23.10.2001 16.22 3,378.73 3,348.52 3,364.99
24.10.2001 16.36 3,332.13 3,390.48 3,390.00
25.10.2001 16.14 3,396.17 3,402.85 3,353.47
26.10.2001 16.36 3,366.56 3,320.82 3,307.99
29.10.2001 16.81 3,301.03 3,264.58 3,277.71
30.10.2001 16.85 3,324.85 3,261.68 3,232.89
31.10.2001 16.67 3,364.23 3,335.51 3,254.73
1.11.2001 16.67 3,369.73 3,342.73 3,253.11
2.11.2001 16.56 3,422.50 3,387.41 3,268.46
5.11.2001 16.87 3,422.69 3,438.18 3,310.85
6.11.2001 16.89 3,460.61 3,429.15 3,223.59
7.11.2001 17.03 3,497.92 3,440.47 3,274.07
8.11.2001 17.10 3,464.31 3,447.67 3,256.93
9.11.2001 17.32 3,393.41 3,440.24 3,222.23
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12.11.2001 16.96 3,451.79 3,505.03 3,165.95
13.11.2001 17.26 3,455.78 3,517.18 3,173.54
14.11.2001 17.34 3,455.44 3,522.15 3,242.79
15.11.2001 16.92 3,491.62 3,511.65 3,254.27
16.11.2001 16.83 3,507.30 3,551.78 3,293.03
19.11.2001 16.68 3,477.57 3,524.28 3,297.26
20.11.2001 17.01 3,451.86 3,505.09 3,298.47
21.11.2001 16.79 3,490.57 3,506.42 3,286.13
22.11.2001 17.09 3,463.34 3,546.86 3,275.12
23.11.2001 16.81 3,469.09 3,567.27 3,341.93
26.11.2001 16.82 3,438.52 3,542.99 3,329.99
27.11.2001 16.94 3,414.05 3,480.34 3,266.57
28.11.2001 16.93 3,416.39 3,515.70 3,263.41
29.11.2001 17.01 3,458.37 3,514.93 3,304.24
30.11.2001 17.20 3,423.90 3,484.30 3,222.83
3.12.2001 17.06 3,470.49 3,529.95 3,220.64
4.12.2001 17.31 3,559.40 3,608.26 3,289.71
5.12.2001 17.50 3,583.81 3,600.18 3,309.76
6.12.2001 17.60 3,547.41 3,572.92 3,260.11
7.12.2001 17.53 3,485.84 3,516.07 3,185.65
10.12.2001 17.35 3,488.12 3,505.70 3,161.96
11.12.2001 17.41 3,478.80 3,509.10 3,235.08
12.12.2001 17.59 3,430.32 3,453.75 3,151.93
13.12.2001 17.29 3,418.43 3,463.43 3,127.84
14.12.2001 17.38 3,505.24 3,500.83 3,069.05
17.12.2001 17.27 3,497.59 3,526.37 3,086.15
18.12.2001 17.36 3,455.93 3,547.13 3,099.36
19.12.2001 17.18 3,431.66 3,517.98 3,122.39
20.12.2001 17.32 3,455.48 3,530.58 3,073.35
21.12.2001 17.27 3,434.50 3,527.36 3,066.07
24.12.2001 17.05 3,434.50 3,527.36 3,055.90
25.12.2001 17.05 3,442.60 3,541.45 3,027.98
26.12.2001 17.07 3,515.78 3,567.89 3,074.30
27.12.2001 17.72 3,523.01 3,578.89 3,126.88
28.12.2001 17.81 3,546.98 3,538.52 3,130.19
31.12.2001 17.94 3,546.98 3,538.52 3,130.19
1.1.2002 17.94 3,551.34 3,560.88 3,107.87
2.1.2002 18.18 3,602.94 3,597.42 3,120.13
3.1.2002 18.37 3,591.07 3,621.11 3,206.85
4.1.2002 18.38 3,550.04 3,598.50 3,214.74
7.1.2002 18.32 3,516.36 3,585.23 3,130.86
8.1.2002 18.16 3,510.13 3,568.17 3,109.46
9.1.2002 18.24 3,488.87 3,570.87 3,072.30
10.1.2002 18.21 3,500.35 3,538.56 3,054.41
11.1.2002 18.10 3,439.08 3,515.83 3,065.02
14.1.2002 18.02 3,455.98 3,541.87 3,009.81
15.1.2002 17.69 3,393.10 3,485.75 3,007.29
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16.1.2002 17.40 3,424.08 3,520.87 2,995.62
17.1.2002 17.55 3,420.44 3,483.76 3,037.26
18.1.2002 17.49 3,402.59 3,483.19 3,036.91
21.1.2002 17.43 3,403.50 3,456.98 2,943.20
22.1.2002 17.52 3,426.96 3,483.46 2,921.01
23.1.2002 17.37 3,453.87 3,496.03 2,932.45
24.1.2002 17.56 3,392.01 3,499.80 2,956.72
25.1.2002 17.30 3,405.82 3,499.18 3,004.97
28.1.2002 17.45 3,360.83 3,403.12 2,950.04
29.1.2002 17.39 3,322.28 3,437.93 2,910.95
30.1.2002 17.16 3,361.99 3,489.53 2,925.26
31.1.2002 17.28 3,370.91 3,464.86 2,871.08
1.2.2002 17.34 3,352.69 3,379.10 2,853.07
4.2.2002 17.41 3,305.93 3,367.71 2,789.93
5.2.2002 17.28 3,273.70 3,348.43 2,787.11
6.2.2002 17.34 3,305.44 3,338.62 2,833.75
7.2.2002 17.33 3,314.23 3,389.64 2,842.85
8.2.2002 17.24 3,361.12 3,437.58 2,871.83
11.2.2002 17.42 3,352.18 3,423.14 2,943.93
12.2.2002 17.40 3,365.40 3,457.12 2,959.39
13.2.2002 17.52 3,394.06 3,451.93 2,981.24
14.2.2002 17.64 3,375.83 3,410.95 2,973.13
15.2.2002 17.70 3,346.17 3,411.81 2,975.12
18.2.2002 17.59 3,297.50 3,348.71 2,888.74
19.2.2002 17.48 3,269.62 3,392.39 2,874.04
20.2.2002 17.35 3,298.05 3,341.37 2,950.83
21.2.2002 17.48 3,287.17 3,368.56 2,961.89
22.2.2002 17.69 3,315.77 3,428.01 2,944.16
25.2.2002 17.68 3,330.18 3,427.53 2,922.70
26.2.2002 17.79 3,362.90 3,431.67 2,985.29
27.2.2002 18.04 3,361.44 3,422.60 3,015.06
28.2.2002 18.04 3,392.48 3,503.71 3,076.93
1.3.2002 18.15 3,477.15 3,574.22 3,251.32
4.3.2002 18.39 3,462.14 3,551.21 3,244.08
5.3.2002 18.58 3,491.59 3,602.49 3,261.96
6.3.2002 18.58 3,532.32 3,585.84 3,408.06
7.3.2002 19.12 3,536.92 3,605.11 3,414.85
8.3.2002 19.36 3,517.61 3,617.72 3,465.29
11.3.2002 19.15 3,477.55 3,608.37 3,369.24
12.3.2002 19.09 3,487.92 3,574.23 3,294.21
13.3.2002 19.04 3,517.48 3,569.09 3,339.90
14.3.2002 19.24 3,550.94 3,610.63 3,365.13
15.3.2002 19.32 3,561.97 3,609.71 3,286.92
18.3.2002 19.33 3,577.25 3,623.01 3,352.01
19.3.2002 19.59 3,551.21 3,566.21 3,305.95
20.3.2002 19.50 3,535.09 3,571.52 3,288.33
21.3.2002 19.66 3,541.74 3,557.98 3,215.97
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22.3.2002 19.64 3,509.55 3,505.37 3,198.07
25.3.2002 19.57 3,517.12 3,524.08 3,193.56
26.3.2002 19.56 3,507.22 3,541.95 3,227.18
27.3.2002 19.64 3,544.68 3,550.08 3,253.66
28.3.2002 19.65 3,544.68 3,550.08 3,190.48
29.3.2002 19.65 3,577.49 3,547.65 3,158.05
1.4.2002 19.80 3,560.82 3,516.99 3,202.95
2.4.2002 20.07 3,553.21 3,483.92 3,255.22
3.4.2002 20.13 3,524.70 3,485.11 3,285.12
4.4.2002 19.82 3,516.29 3,474.35 3,276.83
5.4.2002 19.72 3,453.03 3,479.63 3,279.99
8.4.2002 19.64 3,465.53 3,455.15 3,234.69
9.4.2002 19.64 3,504.16 3,492.78 3,257.61
10.4.2002 19.60 3,463.23 3,408.21 3,226.56
11.4.2002 19.77 3,467.13 3,431.41 3,181.87
12.4.2002 19.66 3,496.52 3,404.73 3,224.52
15.4.2002 19.72 3,559.57 3,484.99 3,266.36
16.4.2002 19.95 3,581.53 3,478.94 3,317.26
17.4.2002 20.12 3,566.60 3,474.16 3,353.04
18.4.2002 20.26 3,568.33 3,477.67 3,325.03
19.4.2002 20.14 3,541.74 3,422.46 3,376.44
22.4.2002 20.00 3,531.38 3,398.18 3,385.97
23.4.2002 19.95 3,529.18 3,376.09 3,378.88
24.4.2002 20.01 3,518.50 3,373.21 3,407.31
25.4.2002 19.85 3,503.63 3,325.38 3,384.29
26.4.2002 19.89 3,504.67 3,290.87 3,376.63
29.4.2002 19.83 3,520.56 3,327.40 3,363.94
30.4.2002 19.97 3,529.31 3,358.45 3,397.74
1.5.2002 20.09 3,516.59 3,351.11 3,394.17
2.5.2002 20.45 3,529.86 3,314.90 3,416.83
3.5.2002 20.57 3,529.80 3,250.22 3,404.06
6.5.2002 20.48 3,478.04 3,239.00 3,363.31
7.5.2002 20.08 3,539.11 3,365.67 3,372.00
8.5.2002 20.40 3,527.24 3,315.73 3,395.40
9.5.2002 20.44 3,504.66 3,262.35 3,399.60
10.5.2002 20.68 3,529.73 3,323.09 3,372.03
13.5.2002 20.70 3,536.87 3,394.38 3,341.53
14.5.2002 20.78 3,574.39 3,378.66 3,415.73
15.5.2002 20.74 3,570.61 3,401.40 3,451.90
16.5.2002 21.02 3,592.60 3,428.28 3,520.10
17.5.2002 21.24 3,575.26 3,383.67 3,541.89
20.5.2002 21.30 3,557.10 3,346.16 3,565.49
21.5.2002 21.14 3,540.07 3,363.74 3,601.51
22.5.2002 21.12 3,527.02 3,399.91 3,584.64
23.5.2002 21.06 3,533.79 3,358.45 3,605.18
24.5.2002 21.06 3,527.44 3,358.49 3,581.65
27.5.2002 21.00 3,526.42 3,331.51 3,582.67
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28.5.2002 21.18 3,528.00 3,308.68 3,566.28
29.5.2002 20.75 3,498.56 3,300.62 3,583.20
30.5.2002 20.62 3,514.06 3,306.51 3,534.30
31.5.2002 20.40 3,499.54 3,224.17 3,577.36
3.6.2002 20.48 3,454.10 3,224.68 3,528.30
4.6.2002 20.08 3,413.32 3,251.34 3,505.14
5.6.2002 19.95 3,425.12 3,187.60 3,492.59
6.6.2002 20.22 3,380.87 3,180.31 3,465.08
7.6.2002 19.69 3,385.49 3,189.35 3,445.74
10.6.2002 19.79 3,412.98 3,133.45 3,437.03
11.6.2002 20.09 3,352.43 3,155.35 3,414.26
12.6.2002 20.23 3,310.68 3,124.23 3,371.89
13.6.2002 20.27 3,235.53 3,117.18 3,325.98
14.6.2002 19.71 3,327.56 3,205.63 3,239.99
17.6.2002 20.07 3,325.50 3,208.25 3,282.83
18.6.2002 20.17 3,295.61 3,156.12 3,206.16
19.6.2002 20.27 3,253.97 3,110.85 3,252.09
20.6.2002 19.91 3,261.69 3,056.28 3,230.88
21.6.2002 19.87 3,207.40 3,068.44 3,263.33
24.6.2002 19.52 3,262.56 3,016.77 3,259.34
25.6.2002 19.57 3,258.75 3,006.73 3,221.05
26.6.2002 19.05 3,277.94 3,058.46 3,244.65
27.6.2002 19.49 3,393.52 3,057.03 3,347.08
28.6.2002 19.84 3,402.84 2,989.54 3,341.50
1.7.2002 19.95 3,297.67 2,927.63 3,340.05
2.7.2002 19.92 3,191.87 2,945.33 3,395.52
3.7.2002 19.59 3,251.55 2,945.41 3,362.04
4.7.2002 19.61 3,355.92 3,053.16 3,394.31
5.7.2002 19.98 3,385.79 3,016.65 3,409.09
8.7.2002 20.27 3,368.36 2,942.26 3,472.08
9.7.2002 20.31 3,248.95 2,847.55 3,428.61
10.7.2002 20.02 3,134.38 2,870.05 3,394.78
11.7.2002 19.84 3,139.47 2,853.14 3,408.90
12.7.2002 19.51 3,026.97 2,842.70 3,370.47
15.7.2002 19.66 3,037.24 2,796.19 3,319.94
16.7.2002 19.53 3,129.86 2,814.88 3,314.17
17.7.2002 19.76 3,176.09 2,738.43 3,366.80
18.7.2002 19.83 3,046.92 2,638.08 3,321.17
19.7.2002 19.60 2,881.47 2,550.49 3,300.05
22.7.2002 18.65 2,791.33 2,477.57 3,289.26
23.7.2002 17.62 2,756.92 2,618.89 3,247.20
24.7.2002 16.60 2,878.20 2,601.08 3,208.22
25.7.2002 17.47 2,876.78 2,647.80 3,073.70
26.7.2002 17.40 3,008.41 2,791.33 3,074.12
29.7.2002 17.65 3,017.97 2,804.62 3,150.59
30.7.2002 18.05 3,016.28 2,832.44 3,126.24
31.7.2002 18.29 2,900.94 2,747.93 3,114.16
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1.8.2002 18.25 2,907.64 2,686.86 3,104.24
2.8.2002 18.02 2,821.84 2,596.95 3,100.87
5.8.2002 17.49 2,875.63 2,671.83 3,003.69
6.8.2002 17.43 2,860.50 2,724.77 3,102.34
7.8.2002 17.70 2,961.01 2,815.26 3,090.85
8.8.2002 17.95 3,013.10 2,826.15 3,157.72
9.8.2002 18.03 2,963.93 2,810.98 3,125.10
12.8.2002 17.92 2,995.00 2,749.94 3,113.13
13.8.2002 18.10 2,952.91 2,857.90 3,162.13
14.8.2002 18.10 3,022.20 2,889.36 3,173.18
15.8.2002 18.25 3,046.63 2,886.71 3,173.33
16.8.2002 18.34 3,108.92 2,954.20 3,098.22
19.8.2002 18.26 3,060.14 2,913.46 3,095.70
20.8.2002 18.30 3,102.83 2,951.96 3,117.19
21.8.2002 18.43 3,138.48 2,993.77 3,133.91
22.8.2002 18.44 3,098.66 2,924.60 3,143.39
23.8.2002 18.33 3,075.23 2,947.79 3,195.61
26.8.2002 18.25 3,152.56 2,905.59 3,170.54
27.8.2002 18.44 3,039.82 2,853.19 3,134.26
28.8.2002 18.14 2,999.13 2,852.49 3,089.37
29.8.2002 17.78 3,016.47 2,846.76 3,086.12
30.8.2002 17.98 2,974.78 2,847.07 3,059.50
2.9.2002 17.89 2,891.33 2,727.95 3,000.58
3.9.2002 17.61 2,897.02 2,775.33 2,932.36
4.9.2002 17.41 2,877.62 2,730.62 2,975.09
5.9.2002 17.10 2,944.55 2,775.75 2,940.94
6.9.2002 17.37 2,896.38 2,802.90 2,974.16
9.9.2002 17.17 2,947.70 2,822.76 2,971.18
10.9.2002 17.08 2,996.68 2,823.94 2,971.07
11.9.2002 17.20 2,905.66 2,753.47 2,986.03
12.9.2002 17.10 2,857.00 2,760.27 2,928.40
13.9.2002 16.84 2,833.77 2,765.22 2,900.04
16.9.2002 16.65 2,801.16 2,710.32 2,967.01
17.9.2002 16.56 2,724.33 2,696.40 2,970.54
18.9.2002 16.23 2,689.50 2,615.20 3,027.53
19.9.2002 15.90 2,698.43 2,619.83 2,923.76
20.9.2002 15.90 2,611.47 2,583.75 2,910.70
23.9.2002 15.81 2,565.59 2,539.54 2,877.02
24.9.2002 15.27 2,599.52 2,603.67 2,851.31
25.9.2002 15.39 2,709.71 2,649.19 2,904.01
26.9.2002 15.65 2,708.24 2,563.71 2,959.28
27.9.2002 15.60 2,619.71 2,529.03 2,937.14
30.9.2002 15.60 2,648.31 2,629.24 2,867.21
1.10.2002 15.50 2,722.76 2,568.35 2,827.17
2.10.2002 15.66 2,693.79 2,539.83 2,795.66
3.10.2002 15.87 2,625.76 2,482.58 2,818.76
4.10.2002 15.87 2,593.16 2,435.36 2,705.63
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7.10.2002 15.76 2,542.85 2,474.41 2,711.94
8.10.2002 15.69 2,543.34 2,408.09 2,675.60
9.10.2002 15.65 2,596.33 2,492.96 2,650.18
10.10.2002 15.63 2,723.20 2,590.84 2,678.54
11.10.2002 16.31 2,700.25 2,609.47 2,677.02
14.10.2002 16.38 2,844.20 2,735.10 2,757.25
15.10.2002 16.76 2,799.49 2,669.53 2,782.88
16.10.2002 16.53 2,862.30 2,731.24 2,788.67
17.10.2002 16.51 2,846.38 2,747.20 2,807.14
18.10.2002 16.24 2,856.27 2,793.40 2,794.01
21.10.2002 16.27 2,839.36 2,764.70 2,714.29
22.10.2002 16.01 2,753.34 2,782.49 2,745.78
23.10.2002 15.91 2,817.04 2,741.57 2,725.45
24.10.2002 15.98 2,811.60 2,787.36 2,767.61
25.10.2002 15.98 2,856.34 2,766.61 2,776.95
28.10.2002 16.05 2,750.16 2,738.47 2,771.12
29.10.2002 15.76 2,813.94 2,767.37 2,786.25
30.10.2002 15.84 2,873.06 2,752.80 2,768.76
31.10.2002 16.21 2,855.75 2,800.71 2,782.13
1.11.2002 16.20 2,948.45 2,827.05 2,784.67
4.11.2002 16.58 2,973.26 2,849.74 2,851.53
5.11.2002 16.57 2,934.71 2,876.22 2,845.12
6.11.2002 16.56 2,910.96 2,811.34 2,851.36
7.11.2002 16.70 2,891.55 2,786.00 2,825.46
8.11.2002 16.58 2,869.11 2,726.85 2,760.66
11.11.2002 16.53 2,906.41 2,748.38 2,752.47
12.11.2002 16.50 2,879.34 2,745.61 2,736.49
13.11.2002 16.59 2,920.98 2,812.87 2,700.58
14.11.2002 16.54 2,944.83 2,830.22 2,756.78
15.11.2002 16.62 2,977.58 2,802.99 2,697.00
18.11.2002 16.72 2,970.23 2,791.64 2,682.33
19.11.2002 16.56 2,944.27 2,845.96 2,696.19
20.11.2002 16.27 3,026.23 2,908.98 2,745.74
21.11.2002 16.55 3,027.19 2,898.38 2,777.26
22.11.2002 16.58 2,986.53 2,907.61 2,821.70
25.11.2002 16.49 2,933.50 2,845.97 2,804.92
26.11.2002 16.37 2,986.81 2,926.01 2,816.81
27.11.2002 16.65 3,022.88 2,926.53 2,875.77
28.11.2002 16.95 3,014.19 2,918.35 2,875.42
29.11.2002 17.19 3,013.54 2,915.48 2,830.06
2.12.2002 17.50 2,956.83 2,872.89 2,834.41
3.12.2002 17.14 2,951.51 2,862.55 2,773.23
4.12.2002 17.30 2,920.05 2,828.14 2,738.86
5.12.2002 17.12 2,927.58 2,846.09 2,754.48
6.12.2002 16.69 2,865.25 2,783.17 2,742.22
9.12.2002 16.72 2,877.80 2,823.03 2,742.63
10.12.2002 16.73 2,906.24 2,825.62 2,733.13
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11.12.2002 16.56 2,883.63 2,816.93 2,737.04
12.12.2002 16.65 2,863.00 2,780.68 2,737.91
13.12.2002 16.71 2,935.42 2,845.21 2,709.79
16.12.2002 16.67 2,919.10 2,821.33 2,729.82
17.12.2002 16.85 2,858.51 2,783.87 2,671.35
18.12.2002 17.01 2,846.36 2,763.35 2,700.96
19.12.2002 17.06 2,878.32 2,797.92 2,698.81
20.12.2002 17.17 2,885.06 2,805.07 2,705.54
23.12.2002 17.02 2,896.99 2,789.26 2,730.84
24.12.2002 17.10 2,896.99 2,789.26 2,722.91
25.12.2002 17.10 2,900.89 2,779.54 2,766.82
26.12.2002 17.11 2,831.97 2,735.45 2,782.36
27.12.2002 17.22 2,874.87 2,745.85 2,792.19
30.12.2002 17.29 2,905.19 2,747.84 2,791.51
31.12.2002 17.37 2,905.19 2,747.84 2,791.51
1.1.2003 17.37 2,959.08 2,839.44 2,767.28
2.1.2003 17.40 2,985.83 2,839.63 2,772.47
3.1.2003 17.77 3,015.11 2,904.14 2,837.75
6.1.2003 17.82 2,978.69 2,885.87 2,790.34
7.1.2003 17.72 2,925.80 2,844.73 2,751.14
8.1.2003 17.32 2,967.21 2,899.14 2,759.61
9.1.2003 17.43 2,989.46 2,901.58 2,755.78
10.1.2003 17.66 2,992.33 2,898.43 2,773.43
13.1.2003 17.67 3,013.20 2,916.68 2,814.61
14.1.2003 17.65 2,969.65 2,876.48 2,848.08
15.1.2003 17.76 2,965.50 2,865.31 2,846.21
16.1.2003 17.89 2,920.96 2,824.83 2,853.67
17.1.2003 17.82 2,884.43 2,824.59 2,819.11
20.1.2003 17.84 2,856.58 2,781.83 2,842.96
21.1.2003 17.61 2,811.56 2,755.73 2,822.33
22.1.2003 17.38 2,804.68 2,784.16 2,879.00
23.1.2003 17.27 2,793.64 2,705.01 2,853.86
24.1.2003 17.26 2,702.64 2,660.06 2,790.53
27.1.2003 16.72 2,708.35 2,693.34 2,773.78
28.1.2003 16.56 2,727.75 2,712.61 2,733.12
29.1.2003 16.42 2,768.77 2,652.59 2,710.79
30.1.2003 16.59 2,768.04 2,687.12 2,686.88
31.1.2003 16.49 2,815.52 2,701.90 2,720.48
3.2.2003 16.37 2,757.94 2,664.04 2,748.05
4.2.2003 16.33 2,799.41 2,650.00 2,749.13
5.2.2003 16.24 2,738.87 2,634.29 2,733.83
6.2.2003 16.15 2,709.97 2,608.42 2,721.54
7.2.2003 16.26 2,682.48 2,626.58 2,714.46
10.2.2003 16.04 2,731.22 2,605.71 2,707.28
11.2.2003 16.12 2,684.84 2,573.64 2,752.89
12.2.2003 16.07 2,693.25 2,570.26 2,745.98
13.2.2003 15.89 2,725.37 2,623.41 2,764.56
 91
14.2.2003 15.86 2,761.15 2,624.81 2,786.11
17.2.2003 15.79 2,774.79 2,676.65 2,792.05
18.2.2003 15.83 2,725.07 2,659.11 2,795.19
19.2.2003 15.67 2,727.50 2,635.62 2,789.46
20.2.2003 15.55 2,749.57 2,669.13 2,752.38
21.2.2003 15.51 2,706.27 2,622.47 2,773.93
24.2.2003 15.27 2,624.58 2,640.18 2,720.15
25.2.2003 14.93 2,616.73 2,608.04 2,721.93
26.2.2003 15.01 2,624.93 2,639.27 2,710.33
27.2.2003 14.82 2,677.78 2,651.82 2,697.81
28.2.2003 15.22 2,703.93 2,632.08 2,726.18
3.3.2003 15.50 2,657.13 2,593.63 2,729.08
4.3.2003 15.37 2,648.52 2,619.78 2,728.24
5.3.2003 15.49 2,627.77 2,595.53 2,696.39
6.3.2003 15.24 2,588.45 2,617.33 2,651.57
7.3.2003 14.99 2,531.80 2,550.93 2,615.52
10.3.2003 15.03 2,533.87 2,530.89 2,563.12
11.3.2003 15.11 2,445.41 2,540.07 2,593.68
12.3.2003 15.28 2,553.04 2,624.20 2,553.21
13.3.2003 15.33 2,629.46 2,628.47 2,582.55
14.3.2003 15.33 2,695.06 2,720.30 2,557.46
17.3.2003 15.08 2,690.74 2,732.42 2,575.33
18.3.2003 14.84 2,717.18 2,754.56 2,585.88
19.3.2003 15.08 2,711.29 2,761.56 2,628.36
20.3.2003 15.02 2,782.15 2,822.10 2,603.86
21.3.2003 15.18 2,695.65 2,723.98 2,686.36
24.3.2003 15.04 2,732.58 2,756.06 2,636.57
25.3.2003 15.30 2,733.18 2,741.02 2,674.33
26.3.2003 15.25 2,695.38 2,737.23 2,680.17
27.3.2003 15.23 2,693.41 2,722.31 2,649.54
28.3.2003 15.20 2,639.30 2,674.00 2,580.04
31.3.2003 15.24 2,671.77 2,705.24 2,588.23
1.4.2003 15.29 2,732.59 2,774.82 2,600.76
2.4.2003 15.39 2,746.22 2,761.55 2,578.12
3.4.2003 15.44 2,770.66 2,769.11 2,575.56
4.4.2003 15.56 2,844.18 2,773.27 2,619.38
7.4.2003 16.00 2,811.12 2,770.21 2,591.88
8.4.2003 15.91 2,815.93 2,732.50 2,565.18
9.4.2003 16.07 2,796.33 2,749.87 2,561.51
10.4.2003 15.93 2,803.85 2,740.73 2,503.85
11.4.2003 15.95 2,839.57 2,792.55 2,482.37
14.4.2003 16.04 2,888.42 2,809.12 2,519.06
15.4.2003 16.25 2,874.78 2,776.79 2,516.11
16.4.2003 16.46 2,909.38 2,819.49 2,527.92
17.4.2003 16.50 2,909.38 2,819.49 2,531.87
18.4.2003 16.50 2,889.53 2,815.83 2,536.29
21.4.2003 16.49 2,936.36 2,875.37 2,509.96
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22.4.2003 16.55 2,973.52 2,900.23 2,501.54
23.4.2003 16.86 2,948.30 2,876.20 2,527.74
24.4.2003 16.88 2,913.99 2,837.04 2,476.31
25.4.2003 16.96 2,974.34 2,886.77 2,453.46
28.4.2003 16.97 2,967.07 2,895.66 2,466.82
29.4.2003 17.34 2,999.52 2,895.18 2,562.62
30.4.2003 17.45 3,012.77 2,895.64 2,579.99
1.5.2003 17.56 3,022.27 2,937.46 2,588.01
2.5.2003 17.50 3,057.28 2,928.47 2,598.51
5.5.2003 17.68 3,117.81 2,952.88 2,662.45
6.5.2003 18.02 3,084.73 2,939.23 2,697.52
7.5.2003 18.19 3,038.81 2,911.53 2,667.48
8.5.2003 18.25 3,072.28 2,953.40 2,683.05
9.5.2003 18.45 3,090.08 2,990.75 2,710.29
12.5.2003 18.57 3,091.29 2,981.98 2,713.24
13.5.2003 18.53 3,093.85 2,976.87 2,729.31
14.5.2003 18.65 3,122.25 2,999.98 2,696.89
15.5.2003 18.84 3,155.45 2,993.96 2,688.87
16.5.2003 19.23 3,090.47 2,923.03 2,653.76
19.5.2003 18.99 3,096.52 2,919.87 2,658.56
20.5.2003 19.06 3,081.58 2,931.97 2,632.83
21.5.2003 18.98 3,118.34 2,957.98 2,653.05
22.5.2003 19.19 3,124.98 2,961.80 2,702.90
23.5.2003 19.35 3,130.74 2,962.23 2,712.08
26.5.2003 19.32 3,151.02 3,019.07 2,674.46
27.5.2003 19.17 3,186.72 3,022.76 2,666.29
28.5.2003 19.52 3,218.44 3,012.57 2,707.06
29.5.2003 19.66 3,197.64 3,054.39 2,697.44
30.5.2003 19.57 3,250.36 3,066.21 2,752.77
2.6.2003 19.85 3,227.72 3,079.06 2,752.84
3.6.2003 19.67 3,250.04 3,127.30 2,760.58
4.6.2003 19.93 3,273.06 3,141.47 2,815.15
5.6.2003 19.82 3,310.68 3,133.45 2,821.57
6.6.2003 20.06 3,285.66 3,094.74 2,855.15
9.6.2003 20.10 3,278.03 3,122.54 2,849.04
10.6.2003 19.81 3,344.87 3,164.31 2,865.21
11.6.2003 20.14 3,363.14 3,167.03 2,871.23
12.6.2003 19.96 3,335.53 3,135.74 2,890.84
13.6.2003 19.80 3,401.81 3,204.20 2,857.30
16.6.2003 19.91 3,428.36 3,207.59 2,897.62
17.6.2003 20.01 3,413.07 3,202.28 2,910.02
18.6.2003 19.76 3,359.45 3,154.82 2,914.48
19.6.2003 20.20 3,364.41 3,157.01 2,926.33
20.6.2003 19.89 3,286.80 3,112.65 2,949.50
23.6.2003 19.86 3,266.46 3,116.48 2,877.35
24.6.2003 19.72 3,291.35 3,095.21 2,882.84
25.6.2003 19.57 3,253.64 3,128.28 2,856.26
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26.6.2003 19.38 3,253.50 3,099.40 2,899.38
27.6.2003 19.50 3,230.51 3,094.11 2,883.35
30.6.2003 19.43 3,199.13 3,117.85 2,944.14
1.7.2003 19.48 3,240.69 3,153.63 3,042.37
2.7.2003 19.69 3,261.42 3,130.43 3,101.15
3.7.2003 19.61 3,244.78 3,130.10 3,078.55
4.7.2003 19.51 3,279.84 3,188.37 3,142.50
7.7.2003 19.52 3,263.28 3,198.90 3,170.43
8.7.2003 19.35 3,244.87 3,182.19 3,200.59
9.7.2003 19.12 3,220.46 3,138.89 3,174.75
10.7.2003 18.96 3,245.25 3,168.55 3,086.87
11.7.2003 19.21 3,287.03 3,188.74 3,125.06
14.7.2003 19.42 3,248.06 3,177.35 3,131.12
15.7.2003 19.51 3,222.94 3,157.11 3,099.55
16.7.2003 19.69 3,185.37 3,119.42 3,021.54
17.7.2003 19.42 3,199.23 3,153.85 3,029.39
18.7.2003 19.43 3,197.14 3,110.20 3,038.00
21.7.2003 19.58 3,221.28 3,138.53 3,010.61
22.7.2003 19.61 3,244.01 3,141.63 3,049.69
23.7.2003 20.06 3,307.23 3,121.10 3,060.66
24.7.2003 20.44 3,299.39 3,174.62 3,071.02
25.7.2003 20.73 3,325.45 3,168.55 3,096.16
28.7.2003 20.67 3,314.85 3,146.84 3,091.28
29.7.2003 20.77 3,299.90 3,139.92 3,018.11
30.7.2003 20.63 3,296.79 3,149.56 3,008.24
31.7.2003 20.75 3,262.31 3,118.99 3,030.17
1.8.2003 20.81 3,264.40 3,126.19 2,992.27
4.8.2003 20.87 3,287.51 3,071.92 2,974.80
5.8.2003 20.89 3,250.89 3,075.14 2,952.23
6.8.2003 20.89 3,264.24 3,099.37 2,964.98
7.8.2003 20.96 3,274.19 3,111.13 2,966.53
8.8.2003 21.17 3,285.20 3,123.55 3,020.60
11.8.2003 20.95 3,296.84 3,153.54 3,038.75
12.8.2003 20.97 3,309.20 3,135.38 3,080.56
13.8.2003 20.90 3,339.99 3,154.81 3,132.41
14.8.2003 20.81 3,345.09 3,156.35 3,127.31
15.8.2003 20.93 3,349.55 3,184.96 3,160.71
18.8.2003 20.82 3,335.22 3,192.75 3,203.12
19.8.2003 20.73 3,333.85 3,187.06 3,266.48
20.8.2003 20.67 3,319.70 3,195.71 3,308.19
21.8.2003 20.64 3,302.33 3,163.68 3,307.69
22.8.2003 20.50 3,288.82 3,165.60 3,288.95
25.8.2003 20.41 3,251.95 3,175.27 3,292.89
26.8.2003 20.21 3,279.81 3,176.61 3,282.79
27.8.2003 20.28 3,295.18 3,196.32 3,270.70
28.8.2003 20.53 3,291.04 3,213.10 3,321.53
29.8.2003 20.89 3,328.65 3,213.67 3,406.86
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1.9.2003 21.10 3,307.40 3,256.22 3,423.59
2.9.2003 20.93 3,352.74 3,270.23 3,451.91
3.9.2003 21.05 3,367.06 3,277.61 3,420.58
4.9.2003 21.39 3,388.75 3,258.30 3,418.31
5.9.2003 21.42 3,425.44 3,291.28 3,424.77
8.9.2003 21.66 3,409.80 3,264.22 3,484.50
9.9.2003 21.71 3,384.03 3,224.92 3,448.53
10.9.2003 21.40 3,388.23 3,242.57 3,386.92
11.9.2003 21.24 3,401.15 3,249.61 3,437.05
12.9.2003 21.26 3,412.33 3,236.15 3,436.72
15.9.2003 21.39 3,415.43 3,281.29 3,525.74
16.9.2003 21.37 3,442.15 3,271.16 3,562.42
17.9.2003 21.67 3,474.15 3,313.13 3,604.15
18.9.2003 21.66 3,469.21 3,304.32 3,610.12
19.9.2003 21.71 3,446.10 3,263.16 3,567.72
22.9.2003 21.40 3,435.93 3,283.16 3,585.86
23.9.2003 21.55 3,433.15 3,222.40 3,598.71
24.9.2003 21.84 3,421.27 3,202.53 3,526.88
25.9.2003 21.50 3,385.21 3,181.26 3,525.14
26.9.2003 20.96 3,386.08 3,212.09 3,509.22
29.9.2003 21.21 3,358.05 3,180.04 3,515.68
30.9.2003 20.95 3,424.60 3,249.54 3,585.96
1.10.2003 21.41 3,436.04 3,257.29 3,677.74
2.10.2003 21.60 3,500.53 3,286.19 3,717.08
3.10.2003 21.77 3,500.09 3,300.27 3,723.84
6.10.2003 21.93 3,502.38 3,316.83 3,781.48
7.10.2003 21.89 3,508.53 3,301.86 3,704.19
8.10.2003 22.09 3,549.59 3,316.49 3,730.47
9.10.2003 22.06 3,554.16 3,317.07 3,805.37
10.10.2003 22.42 3,577.52 3,339.29 3,794.51
13.10.2003 22.38 3,570.06 3,354.03 3,824.29
14.10.2003 22.47 3,587.62 3,345.54 3,794.54
15.10.2003 22.61 3,591.05 3,357.90 3,842.39
16.10.2003 22.66 3,566.19 3,323.68 3,843.38
17.10.2003 22.64 3,577.26 3,339.25 3,852.35
20.10.2003 22.50 3,586.85 3,345.70 3,847.15
21.10.2003 22.61 3,557.53 3,297.59 3,800.61
22.10.2003 22.78 3,529.86 3,306.80 3,601.45
23.10.2003 22.50 3,537.72 3,292.62 3,631.22
24.10.2003 22.67 3,552.74 3,300.05 3,683.95
27.10.2003 22.82 3,563.77 3,349.95 3,731.05
28.10.2003 22.79 3,577.56 3,354.67 3,785.95
29.10.2003 22.88 3,601.83 3,352.08 3,762.39
30.10.2003 23.33 3,582.93 3,363.04 3,677.52
31.10.2003 23.26 3,595.99 3,388.94 3,643.88
3.11.2003 23.23 3,588.80 3,371.11 3,788.64
4.11.2003 23.27 3,563.79 3,368.51 3,758.23
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5.11.2003 23.02 3,564.00 3,387.70 3,659.83
6.11.2003 23.25 3,613.05 3,374.40 3,710.69
7.11.2003 23.62 3,592.31 3,356.15 3,713.84
10.11.2003 23.63 3,582.03 3,352.88 3,606.00
11.11.2003 23.50 3,629.24 3,393.54 3,597.25
12.11.2003 23.90 3,660.98 3,393.68 3,663.74
13.11.2003 24.00 3,697.27 3,369.35 3,621.81
14.11.2003 24.05 3,635.44 3,348.84 3,491.83
17.11.2003 23.79 3,665.94 3,319.91 3,524.05
18.11.2003 23.92 3,652.67 3,347.64 3,424.84
19.11.2003 23.85 3,643.56 3,321.02 3,491.18
20.11.2003 23.87 3,658.13 3,325.82 3,493.57
21.11.2003 24.10 3,680.27 3,375.81 3,481.36
24.11.2003 24.10 3,688.36 3,382.10 3,512.14
25.11.2003 24.20 3,714.83 3,398.82 3,578.08
26.11.2003 24.30 3,724.81 3,398.75 3,590.50
27.11.2003 24.32 3,735.51 3,398.66 3,573.40
28.11.2003 24.46 3,786.74 3,436.12 3,649.19
1.12.2003 24.57 3,805.93 3,427.55 3,676.48
2.12.2003 24.94 3,833.38 3,422.09 3,672.56
3.12.2003 25.13 3,813.73 3,436.68 3,700.63
4.12.2003 24.99 3,812.32 3,411.87 3,693.52
5.12.2003 25.22 3,818.93 3,436.49 3,626.78
8.12.2003 25.35 3,841.88 3,405.98 3,634.55
9.12.2003 25.79 3,822.79 3,402.29 3,553.39
10.12.2003 25.68 3,815.81 3,438.88 3,593.33
11.12.2003 25.41 3,847.19 3,449.23 3,638.51
12.12.2003 25.56 3,864.01 3,430.22 3,723.13
15.12.2003 25.75 3,857.66 3,452.32 3,656.87
16.12.2003 25.71 3,876.30 3,456.61 3,613.36
17.12.2003 25.54 3,910.55 3,498.33 3,608.69
18.12.2003 25.80 3,914.18 3,496.24 3,660.02
19.12.2003 25.94 3,919.70 3,509.99 3,700.34
22.12.2003 26.15 3,940.04 3,520.44 3,702.21
23.12.2003 26.21 3,958.13 3,516.04 3,698.62
24.12.2003 26.14 3,958.13 3,516.04 3,701.30
25.12.2003 26.14 3,957.97 3,522.36 3,722.05
26.12.2003 26.11 3,980.23 3,567.17 3,749.95
29.12.2003 26.36 4,009.42 3,566.69 3,811.85
30.12.2003 26.50 4,042.33 3,575.70 3,806.15
31.12.2003 26.76 4,042.33 3,575.70 3,806.15
1.1.2004 26.76 4,077.09 3,568.20 3,816.88
2.1.2004 27.08 4,125.04 3,613.00 3,905.73
5.1.2004 27.45 4,148.13 3,616.95 3,895.26
6.1.2004 27.50 4,110.81 3,624.78 3,881.88
7.1.2004 27.07 4,161.86 3,642.92 3,894.00
8.1.2004 27.00 4,179.77 3,613.07 3,923.77
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9.1.2004 27.33 4,160.23 3,629.83 3,923.47
12.1.2004 27.72 4,162.89 3,611.25 3,906.43
13.1.2004 27.93 4,167.34 3,637.37 3,918.90
14.1.2004 28.02 4,141.92 3,641.27 3,868.51
15.1.2004 27.45 4,116.37 3,667.67 3,895.53
16.1.2004 27.19 4,120.01 3,668.96 3,928.81
19.1.2004 27.35 4,162.91 3,668.48 3,948.97
20.1.2004 27.98 4,201.48 3,694.24 3,954.12
21.1.2004 28.32 4,229.97 3,682.54 3,979.08
22.1.2004 28.85 4,214.59 3,674.34 4,001.04
23.1.2004 28.48 4,162.48 3,716.44 3,972.74
26.1.2004 28.11 4,183.80 3,681.08 3,975.54
27.1.2004 28.20 4,198.18 3,630.78 3,953.32
28.1.2004 27.60 4,094.84 3,645.14 3,910.97
29.1.2004 26.98 4,089.99 3,639.27 3,899.63
30.1.2004 27.27 4,103.39 3,652.62 3,906.57
2.2.2004 27.25 4,132.30 3,654.23 3,887.63
3.2.2004 27.26 4,108.59 3,623.04 3,811.32
4.2.2004 27.47 4,129.40 3,628.44 3,824.44
5.2.2004 27.59 4,187.96 3,674.33 3,844.26
6.2.2004 27.71 4,229.20 3,667.01 3,830.77
9.2.2004 28.25 4,236.92 3,685.34 3,832.69
10.2.2004 27.92 4,239.34 3,724.02 3,831.92
11.2.2004 27.97 4,283.10 3,707.45 3,859.27
12.2.2004 28.55 4,262.40 3,688.47 3,893.79
13.2.2004 28.20 4,272.79 3,689.14 3,899.24
16.2.2004 28.14 4,323.95 3,723.02 3,923.48
17.2.2004 28.68 4,326.53 3,706.21 3,899.76
18.2.2004 29.00 4,332.69 3,687.50 3,891.11
19.2.2004 29.22 4,271.92 3,675.96 3,838.06
20.2.2004 29.25 4,272.80 3,666.49 3,888.01
23.2.2004 29.45 4,267.17 3,662.30 3,826.93
24.2.2004 29.36 4,246.47 3,677.29 3,797.58
25.2.2004 29.11 4,211.03 3,684.06 3,811.48
26.2.2004 29.12 4,210.34 3,685.07 3,900.16
27.2.2004 29.59 4,262.14 3,719.92 3,990.41
1.3.2004 30.34 4,236.68 3,696.84 3,976.99
2.3.2004 30.24 4,168.77 3,702.77 3,968.86
3.3.2004 29.82 4,208.25 3,714.91 3,955.48
4.3.2004 29.90 4,272.29 3,725.27 3,986.46
5.3.2004 30.67 4,266.59 3,693.80 3,955.34
8.3.2004 30.84 4,240.55 3,672.60 3,993.03
9.3.2004 30.54 4,171.34 3,617.65 3,962.94
10.3.2004 29.49 4,068.62 3,566.08 3,931.37
11.3.2004 29.23 4,060.40 3,608.78 3,879.56
12.3.2004 29.40 3,995.80 3,556.74 3,942.33
15.3.2004 28.93 4,053.71 3,578.67 3,982.07
 97
16.3.2004 29.58 4,070.14 3,618.27 4,069.27
17.3.2004 29.35 4,064.99 3,613.67 4,146.10
18.3.2004 29.66 4,071.63 3,575.34 4,109.52
19.3.2004 29.70 4,005.78 3,529.44 4,076.96
22.3.2004 29.14 3,995.16 3,524.70 4,087.28
23.3.2004 29.26 3,960.23 3,514.05 4,155.78
24.3.2004 29.10 3,998.75 3,572.40 4,209.47
25.3.2004 28.95 3,982.10 3,569.23 4,286.55
26.3.2004 28.88 4,043.92 3,616.74 4,296.18
29.3.2004 29.43 4,053.57 3,632.56 4,282.69
30.3.2004 28.98 4,080.45 3,628.49 4,348.68
31.3.2004 29.42 4,154.25 3,649.16 4,346.76
1.4.2004 29.54 4,151.64 3,681.12 4,350.91
2.4.2004 29.74 4,132.61 3,709.35 4,373.62
5.4.2004 29.91 4,128.35 3,701.08 4,380.50
6.4.2004 29.83 4,160.22 3,676.30 4,405.90
7.4.2004 30.44 4,157.48 3,672.57 4,393.77
8.4.2004 30.31 4,157.48 3,672.57 4,335.30
9.4.2004 30.31 4,150.17 3,691.21 4,381.34
12.4.2004 30.05 4,127.89 3,639.94 4,373.96
13.4.2004 30.38 4,071.83 3,632.06 4,305.31
14.4.2004 29.98 4,073.81 3,634.40 4,220.17
15.4.2004 30.22 4,133.37 3,652.80 4,235.96
16.4.2004 30.50 4,142.39 3,657.85 4,186.19
19.4.2004 30.35 4,131.41 3,600.68 4,272.41
20.4.2004 30.20 4,077.95 3,618.92 4,226.92
21.4.2004 29.88 4,099.48 3,670.12 4,215.33
22.4.2004 29.66 4,104.23 3,671.31 4,262.77
23.4.2004 29.78 4,130.15 3,657.14 4,282.07
26.4.2004 29.61 4,145.63 3,663.57 4,221.40
27.4.2004 29.72 4,069.93 3,607.96 4,216.92
28.4.2004 29.27 4,071.83 3,581.52 4,201.83
29.4.2004 28.87 4,051.55 3,561.28 4,119.78
30.4.2004 28.68 4,066.41 3,593.69 4,118.15
3.5.2004 28.54 4,127.60 3,604.61 4,142.91
4.5.2004 29.23 4,162.11 3,610.66 4,182.60
5.5.2004 29.89 4,091.64 3,587.24 4,084.25
6.5.2004 29.78 4,038.36 3,536.99 3,963.75
7.5.2004 28.93 3,914.37 3,496.78 3,720.02
10.5.2004 27.72 3,940.82 3,525.39 3,732.92
11.5.2004 27.77 3,931.96 3,531.65 3,851.06
12.5.2004 28.19 3,953.90 3,527.64 3,725.38
13.5.2004 28.45 3,936.89 3,525.04 3,711.63
14.5.2004 28.53 3,926.53 3,488.99 3,603.13
17.5.2004 28.65 3,944.52 3,511.98 3,667.97
18.5.2004 28.38 4,034.94 3,506.38 3,813.95
19.5.2004 28.58 3,974.54 3,508.18 3,779.92
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20.5.2004 28.40 4,000.07 3,522.61 3,889.92
21.5.2004 28.68 4,009.95 3,529.08 3,893.62
24.5.2004 28.74 4,035.44 3,585.68 3,852.23
25.5.2004 29.31 4,067.51 3,591.74 3,911.23
26.5.2004 29.63 4,146.52 3,613.03 3,946.19
27.5.2004 30.03 4,115.23 3,609.37 3,990.54
28.5.2004 29.96 4,122.73 3,610.83 3,987.62
31.5.2004 29.96 4,098.63 3,612.02 4,014.29
1.6.2004 30.26 4,134.33 3,624.54 3,984.11
2.6.2004 30.40 4,140.47 3,597.05 3,894.34
3.6.2004 30.13 4,168.73 3,616.40 3,902.35
4.6.2004 30.20 4,221.51 3,673.77 4,054.68
7.6.2004 30.61 4,217.75 3,678.65 4,078.42
8.6.2004 30.66 4,160.41 3,642.70 4,071.62
9.6.2004 30.22 4,166.82 3,658.66 4,097.46
10.6.2004 29.92 4,135.05 3,657.41 4,063.80
11.6.2004 29.77 4,101.84 3,621.59 4,021.30
14.6.2004 29.67 4,130.85 3,644.93 4,029.77
15.6.2004 29.79 4,149.15 3,651.20 4,088.27
16.6.2004 29.70 4,164.17 3,647.98 4,095.69
17.6.2004 29.99 4,200.48 3,657.72 4,057.03
18.6.2004 30.56 4,187.26 3,642.70 4,117.86
21.6.2004 30.34 4,143.01 3,657.89 4,091.90
22.6.2004 30.22 4,156.98 3,688.90 4,092.61
23.6.2004 30.49 4,204.52 3,680.74 4,195.83
24.6.2004 30.86 4,190.35 3,659.28 4,185.30
25.6.2004 31.28 4,235.83 3,657.13 4,221.07
28.6.2004 31.16 4,191.49 3,666.53 4,202.57
29.6.2004 30.90 4,179.83 3,682.93 4,184.01
30.6.2004 30.82 4,165.37 3,647.48 4,213.24
1.7.2004 30.87 4,186.75 3,636.49 4,153.21
2.7.2004 30.70 4,175.05 3,636.37 4,080.21
5.7.2004 30.90 4,154.87 3,607.29 4,063.57
6.7.2004 31.09 4,179.26 3,616.05 4,060.74
7.7.2004 30.85 4,204.49 3,586.97 4,031.83
8.7.2004 30.87 4,197.95 3,600.00 4,083.62
9.7.2004 30.98 4,185.98 3,602.63 4,131.22
12.7.2004 30.92 4,163.70 3,605.11 4,116.13
13.7.2004 30.68 4,179.05 3,594.60 4,065.41
14.7.2004 30.64 4,129.01 3,578.67 4,059.23
15.7.2004 30.62 4,163.01 3,563.61 4,087.65
16.7.2004 30.86 4,134.61 3,564.02 4,104.66
19.7.2004 30.56 4,128.37 3,587.41 4,062.08
20.7.2004 30.35 4,117.79 3,540.08 4,054.01
21.7.2004 30.19 4,070.10 3,550.02 4,033.78
22.7.2004 30.05 4,027.18 3,515.17 3,976.11
23.7.2004 29.73 4,002.64 3,504.66 3,964.67
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26.7.2004 29.67 4,008.95 3,535.58 3,901.84
27.7.2004 29.46 4,012.73 3,539.28 3,923.85
28.7.2004 29.74 4,069.96 3,559.14 3,891.33
29.7.2004 30.16 4,065.44 3,563.48 3,965.03
30.7.2004 30.28 4,060.35 3,578.57 3,975.22
2.8.2004 30.44 4,082.76 3,559.72 3,959.78
3.8.2004 30.76 4,050.07 3,555.31 3,899.11
4.8.2004 30.73 4,053.41 3,498.73 3,905.19
5.8.2004 30.51 4,031.43 3,447.21 3,919.42
6.8.2004 30.46 3,996.89 3,450.40 3,886.24
9.8.2004 30.36 4,040.14 3,494.21 3,881.45
10.8.2004 30.64 3,980.34 3,483.23 3,920.36
11.8.2004 30.11 3,980.48 3,442.35 3,904.34
12.8.2004 30.44 4,005.99 3,450.34 3,848.22
13.8.2004 31.07 4,041.64 3,496.60 3,808.92
16.8.2004 31.31 4,042.19 3,505.17 3,850.73
17.8.2004 31.36 4,034.44 3,547.57 3,881.95
18.8.2004 31.07 4,064.23 3,537.92 3,935.29
19.8.2004 31.62 4,043.96 3,562.16 3,943.00
20.8.2004 31.80 4,058.70 3,551.92 3,953.08
23.8.2004 31.70 4,025.78 3,554.17 3,967.21
24.8.2004 31.24 4,030.77 3,582.53 3,989.38
25.8.2004 31.12 4,061.91 3,581.75 4,015.94
26.8.2004 31.14 4,075.21 3,591.07 4,039.11
27.8.2004 31.07 4,070.98 3,562.88 4,025.90
30.8.2004 31.11 4,068.51 3,580.96 4,011.93
31.8.2004 31.11 4,102.09 3,590.65 4,039.73
1.9.2004 31.50 4,112.31 3,628.76 4,050.50
2.9.2004 32.10 4,110.20 3,612.45 3,974.55
3.9.2004 31.98 4,132.02 3,612.92 4,046.80
6.9.2004 31.92 4,129.76 3,638.38 4,079.92
7.9.2004 31.77 4,144.93 3,622.95 4,080.85
8.9.2004 31.79 4,133.51 3,630.87 4,026.11
9.9.2004 32.09 4,191.58 3,647.11 4,020.56
10.9.2004 32.41 4,209.74 3,656.38 4,040.29
13.9.2004 32.18 4,207.99 3,663.87 4,069.30
14.9.2004 32.24 4,155.71 3,637.09 4,005.59
15.9.2004 31.96 4,170.30 3,649.52 4,004.33
16.9.2004 32.18 4,202.74 3,663.50 3,974.93
17.9.2004 32.58 4,182.95 3,646.26 3,980.00
20.9.2004 32.53 4,240.06 3,672.37 3,974.56
21.9.2004 33.04 4,210.33 3,624.18 3,949.30
22.9.2004 33.11 4,198.43 3,608.73 3,957.18
23.9.2004 33.57 4,200.85 3,614.27 3,900.50
24.9.2004 33.67 4,184.02 3,591.90 3,876.46
27.9.2004 33.95 4,208.80 3,614.11 3,855.43
28.9.2004 34.35 4,225.05 3,630.72 3,867.49
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29.9.2004 34.13 4,231.78 3,631.36 3,939.31
30.9.2004 34.43 4,297.14 3,686.57 3,978.73
1.10.2004 35.24 4,292.57 3,698.28 4,036.89
4.10.2004 35.34 4,312.79 3,697.08 4,039.05
5.10.2004 35.61 4,308.04 3,723.25 4,059.35
6.10.2004 35.60 4,300.48 3,686.90 4,041.03
7.10.2004 36.09 4,326.44 3,662.05 4,086.12
8.10.2004 36.28 4,311.79 3,668.71 4,102.89
11.10.2004 36.27 4,251.74 3,659.84 4,037.54
12.10.2004 35.66 4,250.47 3,633.47 4,021.15
13.10.2004 35.23 4,263.80 3,604.19 3,987.33
14.10.2004 35.22 4,285.91 3,618.98 3,990.49
15.10.2004 35.05 4,286.22 3,637.23 3,970.24
18.10.2004 35.38 4,327.74 3,603.07 4,021.66
19.10.2004 35.42 4,315.41 3,607.91 3,978.26
20.10.2004 35.19 4,341.07 3,618.02 3,977.27
21.10.2004 35.86 4,346.67 3,583.47 3,993.58
22.10.2004 36.24 4,323.90 3,581.25 3,966.52
25.10.2004 35.93 4,334.91 3,632.98 3,965.52
26.10.2004 35.51 4,385.70 3,677.19 3,980.92
27.10.2004 35.78 4,401.89 3,684.60 4,052.46
28.10.2004 35.31 4,384.75 3,695.68 4,031.74
29.10.2004 35.31 4,429.97 3,695.95 4,012.21
1.11.2004 35.67 4,454.80 3,694.87 4,071.58
2.11.2004 35.34 4,506.88 3,737.65 4,079.29
3.11.2004 36.00 4,522.89 3,795.92 4,106.49
4.11.2004 36.17 4,558.25 3,810.44 4,156.01
5.11.2004 36.49 4,567.67 3,806.51 4,132.07
8.11.2004 36.52 4,552.21 3,804.39 4,115.99
9.11.2004 36.48 4,564.37 3,801.26 4,079.17
10.11.2004 36.28 4,599.18 3,834.79 4,052.13
11.11.2004 36.48 4,628.65 3,870.69 4,139.67
12.11.2004 36.86 4,626.16 3,869.31 4,210.65
15.11.2004 37.06 4,609.08 3,846.66 4,203.67
16.11.2004 37.05 4,667.00 3,868.98 4,228.57
17.11.2004 37.40 4,654.83 3,871.19 4,211.13
18.11.2004 37.63 4,643.35 3,831.63 4,259.78
19.11.2004 38.08 4,614.17 3,856.41 4,176.53
22.11.2004 37.87 4,636.85 3,854.70 4,171.22
23.11.2004 38.56 4,660.58 3,871.29 4,200.97
24.11.2004 39.02 4,722.08 3,872.86 4,227.43
25.11.2004 39.63 4,721.63 3,876.59 4,209.01
26.11.2004 39.74 4,725.80 3,864.36 4,262.91
29.11.2004 40.20 4,707.43 3,847.68 4,235.50
30.11.2004 40.02 4,767.33 3,904.80 4,193.59
1.12.2004 40.06 4,774.26 3,899.69 4,251.50
2.12.2004 38.94 4,799.24 3,900.59 4,296.12
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3.12.2004 38.90 4,796.55 3,897.85 4,262.71
6.12.2004 39.36 4,814.75 3,853.13 4,220.91
7.12.2004 39.74 4,748.24 3,869.58 4,173.71
8.12.2004 38.21 4,710.42 3,890.03 4,118.55
9.12.2004 38.29 4,716.28 3,884.96 4,081.25
10.12.2004 38.45 4,778.89 3,918.01 4,124.93
13.12.2004 38.52 4,779.42 3,933.52 4,146.93
14.12.2004 38.60 4,825.85 3,945.76 4,209.69
15.12.2004 39.24 4,794.67 3,935.68 4,199.28
16.12.2004 39.36 4,745.79 3,909.96 4,231.70
17.12.2004 38.86 4,822.87 3,913.33 4,245.42
20.12.2004 39.87 4,797.64 3,949.07 4,240.40
21.12.2004 39.99 4,828.66 3,962.59 4,276.01
22.12.2004 40.04 4,871.71 3,964.94 4,296.27
23.12.2004 40.44 4,889.93 3,967.51 4,340.56
24.12.2004 40.52 4,912.04 3,952.62 4,358.51
27.12.2004 40.96 4,909.86 3,979.84 4,376.61
28.12.2004 40.57 4,903.20 3,979.72 4,337.38
29.12.2004 40.55 4,918.69 3,983.36 4,417.26
30.12.2004 40.88 4,906.92 3,979.30 4,441.56
31.12.2004 40.88 4,888.25 3,944.75 4,425.27
3.1.2005 40.72 4,845.12 3,897.35 4,376.03
4.1.2005 39.61 4,806.85 3,880.14 4,352.76
5.1.2005 39.13 4,792.78 3,893.22 4,321.51
6.1.2005 39.09 4,778.59 3,887.25 4,311.81
7.1.2005 39.18 4,795.24 3,902.57 4,326.41
10.1.2005 39.75 4,779.46 3,880.67 4,384.01
11.1.2005 39.88 4,791.22 3,899.81 4,407.56
12.1.2005 40.14 4,780.03 3,867.37 4,378.47
13.1.2005 40.32 4,764.82 3,888.46 4,385.73
14.1.2005 40.24 4,779.52 3,888.71 4,417.30
17.1.2005 40.70 4,762.16 3,924.40 4,378.39
18.1.2005 40.77 4,774.84 3,887.69 4,379.80
19.1.2005 40.65 4,725.27 3,859.11 4,309.82
20.1.2005 39.77 4,737.70 3,836.98 4,298.95
21.1.2005 40.22 4,751.60 3,824.95 4,335.65
24.1.2005 40.34 4,750.89 3,836.37 4,283.17
25.1.2005 40.35 4,796.16 3,857.73 4,358.49
26.1.2005 40.42 4,804.11 3,857.12 4,329.72
27.1.2005 40.46 4,775.70 3,845.49 4,318.42
28.1.2005 40.23 4,816.48 3,877.66 4,338.88
31.1.2005 40.23 4,845.25 3,903.47 4,313.53
1.2.2005 40.59 4,870.54 3,916.82 4,332.59
2.2.2005 41.27 4,838.37 3,905.97 4,291.41
3.2.2005 40.92 4,880.73 3,948.78 4,318.66
4.2.2005 41.22 4,864.70 3,943.65 4,321.93
7.2.2005 41.07 4,848.99 3,948.09 4,277.87
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8.2.2005 40.35 4,850.90 3,917.01 4,286.74
9.2.2005 40.45 4,885.45 3,936.40 4,311.60
10.2.2005 40.71 4,923.43 3,964.56 4,309.06
11.2.2005 41.12 4,964.53 3,969.42 4,364.21
14.2.2005 41.56 4,986.01 3,980.90 4,380.89
15.2.2005 41.84 4,965.11 3,982.19 4,344.77
16.2.2005 41.80 5,000.26 3,954.17 4,329.27
17.2.2005 42.44 5,006.88 3,958.48 4,345.59
18.2.2005 42.63 5,003.75 3,958.37 4,356.82
21.2.2005 42.88 5,026.17 3,903.12 4,388.60
22.2.2005 43.29 4,989.57 3,922.80 4,316.79
23.2.2005 43.24 4,991.76 3,952.32 4,319.88
24.2.2005 43.74 5,043.53 3,992.22 4,362.40
25.2.2005 44.02 5,058.08 3,967.29 4,430.18
28.2.2005 44.94 5,061.93 3,987.24 4,428.11
1.3.2005 44.67 5,034.83 3,989.68 4,429.14
2.3.2005 43.98 5,040.83 3,990.54 4,435.87
3.3.2005 44.52 5,121.21 4,031.81 4,460.70
4.3.2005 45.46 5,096.35 4,042.11 4,458.45
7.3.2005 45.42 5,127.35 4,028.14 4,475.13
8.3.2005 45.80 5,104.94 3,987.94 4,521.40
9.3.2005 45.76 5,081.10 3,992.76 4,488.09
10.3.2005 45.41 5,111.14 3,966.31 4,507.80
11.3.2005 45.77 5,070.43 3,990.18 4,450.14
14.3.2005 45.36 5,090.42 3,962.41 4,459.18
15.3.2005 45.28 5,071.15 3,931.33 4,491.83
16.3.2005 45.25 5,053.11 3,939.71 4,449.36
17.3.2005 46.12 5,029.43 3,936.70 4,469.34
18.3.2005 45.80 4,978.74 3,917.34 4,463.73
21.3.2005 45.39 4,997.39 3,881.55 4,462.48
22.3.2005 45.09 4,909.10 3,878.92 4,398.98
23.3.2005 43.74 4,920.73 3,876.35 4,358.78
24.3.2005 43.45 4,920.73 3,876.35 4,378.22
25.3.2005 43.45 4,895.01 3,883.24 4,381.64
28.3.2005 43.11 4,914.77 3,856.92 4,298.04
29.3.2005 43.10 4,919.47 3,908.68 4,283.80
30.3.2005 42.93 4,932.26 3,910.42 4,338.66
31.3.2005 43.46 4,942.46 3,886.40 4,341.17
1.4.2005 43.85 4,870.01 3,894.19 4,297.47
4.4.2005 44.00 4,915.65 3,910.66 4,318.53
5.4.2005 44.12 4,939.36 3,920.76 4,335.27
6.4.2005 44.33 4,976.44 3,943.17 4,351.21
7.4.2005 44.97 4,966.24 3,910.07 4,355.18
8.4.2005 44.76 4,999.53 3,909.32 4,345.89
11.4.2005 44.73 4,953.81 3,929.63 4,295.89
12.4.2005 44.70 4,982.68 3,883.54 4,320.95
13.4.2005 44.49 4,937.25 3,844.26 4,264.72
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14.4.2005 43.85 4,908.72 3,783.47 4,229.47
15.4.2005 43.52 4,854.69 3,794.10 4,092.34
18.4.2005 42.54 4,897.66 3,818.92 4,159.01
19.4.2005 43.03 4,886.24 3,771.71 4,181.21
20.4.2005 43.40 4,895.37 3,842.47 4,151.87
21.4.2005 43.77 4,926.66 3,817.93 4,210.99
22.4.2005 44.14 4,911.06 3,849.02 4,229.94
25.4.2005 44.22 4,885.97 3,817.23 4,210.82
26.4.2005 43.58 4,825.84 3,829.72 4,211.81
27.4.2005 42.62 4,805.74 3,787.60 4,213.63
28.4.2005 41.76 4,815.04 3,831.95 4,251.46
29.4.2005 42.13 4,805.74 3,850.22 4,248.12
2.5.2005 42.03 4,845.35 3,846.50 4,248.97
3.5.2005 42.52 4,898.30 3,896.53 4,282.69
4.5.2005 42.71 4,920.21 3,888.21 4,279.36
5.5.2005 42.66 4,907.94 3,885.69 4,335.95
6.5.2005 43.37 4,883.66 3,911.00 4,303.51
9.5.2005 43.57 4,868.05 3,871.60 4,295.70
10.5.2005 43.74 4,837.05 3,884.81 4,276.53
11.5.2005 43.69 4,829.55 3,846.49 4,229.19
12.5.2005 43.22 4,806.68 3,827.50 4,193.56
13.5.2005 42.24 4,777.54 3,864.14 4,158.19
16.5.2005 42.12 4,787.69 3,891.66 4,125.03
17.5.2005 42.14 4,847.27 3,930.98 4,114.28
18.5.2005 42.60 4,864.56 3,950.23 4,176.02
19.5.2005 42.68 4,840.70 3,944.49 4,152.36
20.5.2005 42.68 4,878.93 3,960.10 4,197.17
23.5.2005 42.73 4,878.28 3,961.55 4,203.00
24.5.2005 43.10 4,880.03 3,947.10 4,156.64
25.5.2005 43.40 4,886.55 3,972.69 4,140.64
26.5.2005 44.15 4,891.80 3,978.76 4,177.28
27.5.2005 44.38 4,890.28 3,980.94 4,213.48
30.5.2005 44.41 4,838.96 3,955.08 4,218.60
31.5.2005 43.91 4,873.25 3,992.67 4,217.30
1.6.2005 44.27 4,880.93 3,999.44 4,214.56
2.6.2005 44.52 4,867.22 3,975.32 4,239.01
3.6.2005 44.63 4,855.12 3,980.53 4,261.86
6.6.2005 44.99 4,908.11 3,978.87 4,246.31
7.6.2005 45.13 4,921.38 3,972.55 4,265.85
8.6.2005 45.62 4,868.09 3,992.17 4,200.79
9.6.2005 45.26 4,869.32 3,984.88 4,209.30
10.6.2005 45.96 4,854.55 3,994.29 4,171.07
13.6.2005 45.41 4,864.53 4,003.22 4,184.03
14.6.2005 45.79 4,871.27 4,015.19 4,207.92
15.6.2005 45.85 4,887.06 4,032.82 4,221.48
16.6.2005 46.24 4,953.12 4,051.13 4,267.39
17.6.2005 46.92 4,916.99 4,051.00 4,241.17
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20.6.2005 46.91 4,939.77 4,041.62 4,273.12
21.6.2005 46.92 4,945.47 4,044.56 4,278.39
22.6.2005 46.64 4,933.00 4,003.67 4,284.19
23.6.2005 46.51 4,907.14 3,975.67 4,264.25
24.6.2005 47.14 4,889.89 3,974.13 4,223.66
27.6.2005 47.06 4,897.99 4,010.17 4,233.51
28.6.2005 47.40 4,908.43 4,005.73 4,239.23
29.6.2005 47.74 4,907.61 3,977.29 4,228.34
30.6.2005 48.05 4,890.69 3,985.03 4,212.42
1.7.2005 48.12 4,877.85 3,985.60 4,227.26
4.7.2005 48.70 4,868.02 4,020.99 4,215.67
5.7.2005 48.47 4,906.28 3,994.68 4,212.13
6.7.2005 49.40 4,826.42 4,005.26 4,194.17
7.7.2005 48.56 4,885.25 4,053.00 4,177.98
8.7.2005 50.07 4,966.99 4,078.63 4,219.49
11.7.2005 50.28 5,000.61 4,089.03 4,253.62
12.7.2005 50.51 4,985.71 4,091.28 4,210.94
13.7.2005 50.32 5,013.41 4,097.63 4,238.64
14.7.2005 50.21 4,978.86 4,102.03 4,244.07
15.7.2005 49.23 4,973.37 4,081.58 4,263.80
18.7.2005 48.87 4,964.22 4,111.34 4,219.24
19.7.2005 48.51 4,960.58 4,130.56 4,213.67
20.7.2005 48.56 5,009.83 4,104.51 4,313.38
21.7.2005 48.92 5,010.08 4,126.59 4,282.70
22.7.2005 49.61 5,011.83 4,109.80 4,261.90
25.7.2005 50.29 4,997.56 4,115.76 4,235.51
26.7.2005 50.20 5,019.38 4,135.73 4,265.05
27.7.2005 50.04 5,061.49 4,158.89 4,271.47
28.7.2005 50.39 5,086.80 4,130.60 4,295.27
29.7.2005 51.41 5,118.71 4,137.42 4,315.65
1.8.2005 51.82 5,158.53 4,169.79 4,343.53
2.8.2005 52.52 5,202.03 4,171.19 4,364.03
3.8.2005 53.49 5,184.86 4,143.68 4,332.74
4.8.2005 53.14 5,152.32 4,108.42 4,260.93
5.8.2005 52.64 5,195.41 4,098.57 4,279.96
8.8.2005 53.44 5,219.49 4,123.34 4,308.29
9.8.2005 53.91 5,283.90 4,120.49 4,433.17
10.8.2005 54.14 5,292.72 4,151.64 4,508.64
11.8.2005 54.88 5,277.69 4,130.98 4,531.99
12.8.2005 54.83 5,248.02 4,140.02 4,540.68
15.8.2005 54.37 5,219.31 4,092.72 4,560.13
16.8.2005 53.42 5,199.83 4,093.78 4,539.82
17.8.2005 53.13 5,126.88 4,084.55 4,511.71
18.8.2005 52.49 5,163.22 4,090.82 4,495.32
19.8.2005 52.92 5,203.37 4,099.80 4,597.44
22.8.2005 54.12 5,160.28 4,088.17 4,589.97
23.8.2005 54.19 5,156.45 4,065.55 4,588.99
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24.8.2005 54.00 5,135.87 4,076.88 4,575.52
25.8.2005 54.35 5,120.37 4,050.86 4,607.11
26.8.2005 54.59 5,109.14 4,076.08 4,522.10
29.8.2005 54.83 5,076.18 4,065.32 4,543.60
30.8.2005 54.60 5,163.78 4,108.38 4,550.34
31.8.2005 56.00 5,271.75 4,115.14 4,619.79
1.9.2005 57.85 5,301.76 4,102.67 4,655.80
2.9.2005 58.02 5,317.72 4,102.36 4,704.10
5.9.2005 57.41 5,346.44 4,151.25 4,668.79
6.9.2005 57.83 5,351.41 4,162.49 4,653.75
7.9.2005 57.56 5,330.93 4,147.18 4,617.67
8.9.2005 56.91 5,354.98 4,182.71 4,701.75
9.9.2005 57.41 5,305.67 4,178.59 4,752.46
12.9.2005 57.14 5,266.01 4,150.74 4,729.41
13.9.2005 56.43 5,296.82 4,139.37 4,743.32
14.9.2005 56.93 5,262.99 4,140.90 4,780.27
15.9.2005 57.16 5,293.50 4,174.15 4,743.21
16.9.2005 57.20 5,277.52 4,156.49 4,744.87
19.9.2005 57.67 5,293.31 4,125.49 4,822.04
20.9.2005 58.09 5,263.57 4,091.16 4,852.27
21.9.2005 58.43 5,211.18 4,103.10 4,826.96
22.9.2005 58.38 5,202.01 4,105.51 4,801.52
23.9.2005 57.30 5,247.87 4,110.02 4,894.24
26.9.2005 56.40 5,219.61 4,109.43 4,845.18
27.9.2005 56.39 5,266.01 4,111.62 4,934.99
28.9.2005 56.96 5,250.56 4,147.38 5,043.28
29.9.2005 57.43 5,289.23 4,156.46 4,984.47
30.9.2005 57.17 5,265.87 4,152.98 4,942.37
3.10.2005 56.72 5,290.79 4,108.54 4,982.28
4.10.2005 56.32 5,243.28 4,044.97 4,955.23
5.10.2005 55.55 5,248.19 4,023.86 4,834.98
6.10.2005 53.74 5,217.16 4,041.04 4,828.94
7.10.2005 53.55 5,200.45 4,014.03 4,814.08
10.10.2005 53.36 5,190.06 4,006.10 4,920.90
11.10.2005 53.86 5,166.63 3,979.18 4,907.16
12.10.2005 54.05 5,073.61 3,972.98 4,888.04
13.10.2005 51.31 5,141.25 4,005.05 4,887.76
14.10.2005 51.21 5,122.72 4,019.65 4,842.88
17.10.2005 51.74 5,069.06 3,974.89 4,808.57
18.10.2005 49.71 5,007.36 4,034.97 4,763.93
19.10.2005 48.35 5,026.94 3,974.05 4,777.93
20.10.2005 49.95 5,017.81 3,984.59 4,776.46
21.10.2005 49.63 5,062.14 4,048.40 4,754.62
24.10.2005 50.61 5,097.67 4,041.24 4,833.78
25.10.2005 51.23 5,108.89 4,022.96 4,833.84
26.10.2005 52.23 5,070.57 3,981.91 4,897.26
27.10.2005 51.88 5,059.40 4,043.61 4,852.14
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28.10.2005 51.14 5,123.14 4,073.62 4,902.96
31.10.2005 52.56 5,130.23 4,061.01 4,987.53
1.11.2005 52.12 5,185.24 4,107.39 4,992.54
2.11.2005 52.76 5,236.64 4,128.97 4,981.54
3.11.2005 54.33 5,147.84 4,130.69 5,006.58
4.11.2005 53.37 5,160.53 4,136.57 5,025.04
7.11.2005 53.10 5,147.56 4,122.65 5,046.70
8.11.2005 52.58 5,132.88 4,130.01 5,020.48
9.11.2005 53.00 5,139.96 4,161.40 4,987.14
10.11.2005 52.53 5,174.90 4,175.94 5,019.10
11.11.2005 51.72 5,174.29 4,173.13 4,940.85
14.11.2005 52.05 5,145.70 4,157.79 4,910.00
15.11.2005 51.40 5,101.68 4,169.23 4,946.59
16.11.2005 50.67 5,153.05 4,209.19 5,052.16
17.11.2005 51.74 5,176.11 4,225.58 5,102.99
18.11.2005 51.58 5,206.23 4,251.68 5,124.23
21.11.2005 51.85 5,201.18 4,275.77 5,094.05
22.11.2005 52.87 5,257.81 4,292.45 5,121.83
23.11.2005 52.86 5,244.60 4,296.15 5,098.43
24.11.2005 52.54 5,235.40 4,303.92 5,098.39
25.11.2005 52.97 5,226.40 4,267.17 5,165.06
28.11.2005 52.75 5,224.73 4,267.56 5,143.75
29.11.2005 52.39 5,210.85 4,241.62 5,107.81
30.11.2005 52.49 5,260.77 4,294.96 5,149.65
1.12.2005 53.02 5,291.62 4,298.55 5,219.04
2.12.2005 53.92 5,301.56 4,289.02 5,243.32
5.12.2005 54.79 5,337.58 4,295.83 5,217.64
6.12.2005 54.55 5,309.17 4,276.91 5,250.86
7.12.2005 55.25 5,359.25 4,274.96 5,168.49
8.12.2005 55.35 5,360.11 4,284.95 5,241.95
9.12.2005 55.75 5,412.95 4,291.11 5,342.82
12.12.2005 56.15 5,411.01 4,315.60 5,368.67
13.12.2005 56.55 5,439.17 4,331.25 5,413.33
14.12.2005 57.10 5,390.15 4,323.66 5,369.71
15.12.2005 55.90 5,452.24 4,313.33 5,390.70
16.12.2005 55.40 5,440.62 4,286.80 5,415.24
19.12.2005 54.46 5,411.77 4,285.34 5,453.08
20.12.2005 54.47 5,405.34 4,296.73 5,502.12
21.12.2005 54.26 5,418.12 4,315.78 5,543.52
22.12.2005 54.90 5,421.23 4,318.20 5,559.22
23.12.2005 54.92 5,421.23 4,318.20 5,588.75
26.12.2005 54.92 5,433.72 4,278.10 5,519.34
27.12.2005 55.12 5,450.58 4,287.35 5,558.45
28.12.2005 55.56 5,448.89 4,275.90 5,568.75
29.12.2005 55.61 5,394.29 4,255.25 5,514.60
30.12.2005 55.64 5,413.90 4,255.25 5,514.60
2.1.2006 55.78 5,532.51 4,328.31 5,577.53
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3.1.2006 57.48 5,637.71 4,347.54 5,675.33
4.1.2006 58.59 5,621.38 4,345.78 5,733.35
5.1.2006 58.55 5,684.71 4,388.45 5,786.45
6.1.2006 59.29 5,660.78 4,401.33 5,806.87
9.1.2006 59.10 5,624.10 4,403.13 5,711.24
10.1.2006 58.22 5,668.68 4,418.88 5,766.48
11.1.2006 57.90 5,660.57 4,390.53 5,811.08
12.1.2006 58.26 5,645.04 4,395.74 5,789.48
13.1.2006 58.15 5,676.70 4,399.30 5,715.04
16.1.2006 58.86 5,608.74 4,381.78 5,561.60
17.1.2006 58.18 5,576.80 4,360.32 5,429.39
18.1.2006 57.12 5,613.97 4,387.40 5,569.36
19.1.2006 58.53 5,568.66 4,311.79 5,585.23
20.1.2006 59.64 5,642.51 4,324.51 5,508.04
23.1.2006 60.06 5,626.29 4,334.33 5,576.14
24.1.2006 60.70 5,682.83 4,326.49 5,542.71
25.1.2006 60.82 5,730.33 4,357.91 5,605.83
26.1.2006 60.71 5,744.79 4,391.97 5,731.62
27.1.2006 61.37 5,719.67 4,400.22 5,743.57
30.1.2006 61.66 5,747.29 4,387.52 5,794.92
31.1.2006 61.63 5,787.07 4,393.80 5,711.11
1.2.2006 62.29 5,728.40 4,355.74 5,736.51
2.2.2006 62.07 5,688.68 4,333.36 5,683.96
3.2.2006 61.00 5,684.69 4,341.21 5,709.20
6.2.2006 61.93 5,651.88 4,300.04 5,737.83
7.2.2006 60.69 5,644.61 4,332.26 5,580.81
8.2.2006 60.11 5,710.93 4,326.69 5,622.27
9.2.2006 60.93 5,669.90 4,333.72 5,596.46
10.2.2006 60.24 5,695.21 4,314.99 5,477.42
13.2.2006 59.11 5,669.39 4,357.66 5,556.70
14.2.2006 57.78 5,689.18 4,371.72 5,517.31
15.2.2006 58.97 5,713.26 4,404.53 5,541.11
16.2.2006 59.35 5,745.83 4,400.76 5,443.11
17.2.2006 60.51 5,772.37 4,404.00 5,365.40
20.2.2006 61.61 5,768.17 4,390.12 5,456.70
21.2.2006 61.90 5,791.19 4,419.58 5,453.80
22.2.2006 60.89 5,800.47 4,404.08 5,616.59
23.2.2006 61.72 5,792.75 4,412.21 5,648.33
24.2.2006 62.31 5,802.62 4,428.91 5,735.76
27.2.2006 62.22 5,752.41 4,386.46 5,755.50
28.2.2006 61.68 5,810.59 4,424.56 5,669.44
1.3.2006 62.72 5,782.87 4,423.06 5,658.13
2.3.2006 63.28 5,797.56 4,417.73 5,578.86
3.3.2006 64.42 5,828.33 4,385.81 5,579.75
6.3.2006 64.16 5,739.28 4,373.11 5,534.50
7.3.2006 62.88 5,718.37 4,376.78 5,493.99
8.3.2006 62.10 5,764.93 4,355.09 5,609.10
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9.3.2006 62.34 5,789.97 4,384.55 5,560.30
10.3.2006 62.33 5,855.17 4,395.20 5,643.11
13.3.2006 63.06 5,909.77 4,442.15 5,682.55
14.3.2006 63.82 5,930.67 4,463.28 5,689.57
15.3.2006 64.23 5,992.51 4,470.19 5,644.16
16.3.2006 65.09 6,004.44 4,473.81 5,747.55
17.3.2006 65.94 6,017.96 4,464.66 5,821.28
20.3.2006 66.19 5,983.54 4,439.35 5,784.96
21.3.2006 64.83 6,003.79 4,463.65 5,775.72
22.3.2006 65.63 5,946.46 4,455.03 5,720.47
23.3.2006 65.67 5,992.20 4,463.73 5,751.66
24.3.2006 66.59 5,953.97 4,456.47 5,821.66
27.3.2006 67.08 5,946.14 4,430.22 5,834.83
28.3.2006 67.67 5,919.94 4,466.59 5,831.94
29.3.2006 67.83 6,036.13 4,462.43 5,921.04
30.3.2006 69.34 5,978.67 4,443.52 5,898.48
31.3.2006 68.92 6,033.19 4,452.62 5,982.85
3.4.2006 70.11 6,075.54 4,478.72 5,988.57
4.4.2006 69.97 6,102.64 4,501.24 5,980.00
5.4.2006 70.52 6,099.08 4,497.19 6,083.06
6.4.2006 71.40 6,018.86 4,454.51 6,094.78
7.4.2006 70.48 6,044.86 4,458.32 6,055.49
10.4.2006 71.66 5,989.14 4,424.52 6,022.02
11.4.2006 71.78 5,970.76 4,427.44 5,942.16
12.4.2006 70.76 5,983.70 4,431.97 5,949.61
13.4.2006 70.53 5,983.70 4,431.97 5,952.15
14.4.2006 70.53 6,072.52 4,423.44 5,916.69
17.4.2006 71.69 6,075.47 4,497.96 5,986.77
18.4.2006 73.11 6,171.99 4,508.94 6,009.54
19.4.2006 74.38 6,178.44 4,508.35 6,035.17
20.4.2006 75.70 6,236.88 4,510.06 6,096.36
21.4.2006 75.66 6,221.84 4,498.64 6,046.54
24.4.2006 76.52 6,236.77 4,481.10 6,069.64
25.4.2006 76.16 6,271.85 4,493.71 6,077.21
26.4.2006 77.36 6,287.63 4,508.45 6,140.98
27.4.2006 75.63 6,290.60 4,512.36 6,085.73
28.4.2006 76.01 6,318.60 4,496.79 6,151.01
1.5.2006 76.20 6,382.80 4,523.66 6,215.55
2.5.2006 77.58 6,317.02 4,505.72 6,200.56
3.5.2006 78.12 6,389.47 4,519.68 6,202.86
4.5.2006 79.49 6,480.33 4,568.08 6,263.03
5.5.2006 79.67 6,474.63 4,565.22 6,375.09
8.5.2006 78.61 6,526.39 4,570.11 6,363.48
9.5.2006 79.58 6,515.11 4,563.90 6,317.21
10.5.2006 80.37 6,505.51 4,506.70 6,265.76
11.5.2006 81.01 6,404.68 4,454.22 6,195.45
12.5.2006 79.47 6,291.21 4,457.43 6,167.66
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15.5.2006 74.46 6,312.26 4,450.22 6,051.14
16.5.2006 74.26 6,107.83 4,376.94 6,118.34
17.5.2006 74.09     5,973.75
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Appendix B Distribution of returns 
 
 
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
-0.050 -0.025 -0.000 0.025 0.050
Series: TOT_OSLO
Sample 1 1304
Observations 1304
Mean       0.000980
Median   0.001375
Maximum  0.051082
Minimum -0.065118
Std. Dev.   0.012029
Skewness  -0.723826
Kurtosis   6.257155
Jarque-Bera  690.2914
Probability  0.000000
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350
-0.050 -0.025 -0.000 0.025 0.050
Series: MSCI_NORTH_AMERICA
Sample 1 1304
Observations 1303
Mean       7.65e-05
Median   0.000325
Maximum  0.055473
Minimum -0.050160
Std. Dev.   0.010467
Skewness   0.155690
Kurtosis   5.953298
Jarque-Bera  478.7942
Probability  0.000000
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40
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240
-0.075 -0.050 -0.025 0.000 0.025 0.050
Series: MSCI_FAR_EAST
Sample 1 1304
Observations 1304
Mean       0.000268
Median   0.000370
Maximum  0.055131
Minimum -0.072639
Std. Dev.   0.012523
Skewness  -0.307786
Kurtosis   4.973236
Jarque-Bera  232.1439
Probability  0.000000
Appendix C Credit spread 
 
Source: Lecture notes Corporate finance (fall 2004) Thore Johnsen 
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